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UNMASKING A PRETEXT FOR RES IPSA 
LOQUITUR:  A PROPOSAL TO LET 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION SPEAK 
FOR ITSELF 
WILLIAM R. CORBETT* 
Has too much tort law been incorporated into the case law under the federal 
employment discrimination statutes?  The debate on this issue has been 
reinvigorated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Staub v. Proctor Hospital.  
In Staub, the Court referred to the Uniformed Services Employment and 
Reemployment Rights Act, a federal employment discrimination statute, as a 
“federal tort.”  The Court then adopted the tort doctrine of proximate cause as 
the standard for evaluating subordinate bias (or “cat’s paw”) liability.  Staub 
was not the first case in which the Court has suggested that a federal 
employment discrimination law is a federal statutory tort, but it was the most 
express and direct statement.  Moreover, the Court’s adoption of proximate 
cause, one of the most complicated, confusing, and criticized concepts in tort 
law, to analyze a prevalent issue in employment discrimination law is striking 
and provocative.  Staub reinvigorates the debate about whether the Court and 
courts have imported too much tort law into employment discrimination law—
the debate about the “tortification” of employment discrimination law. 
Most discussions of tortification of discrimination law trace the origin to the 
Supreme Court’s discussion of torts causation standards in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.  However, it actually began much earlier.  The 
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ubiquitous pretext analysis, developed by the Court to analyze individual 
disparate treatment cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green is a 
thinly veiled version of the tort doctrine res ipsa loquitur.  Although there have 
been numerous critiques of the McDonnell Douglas analysis that have called 
for its abrogation, none have exposed it as the much-maligned tort doctrine.  
Evaluating McDonnell Douglas as res ipsa helps explain its weaknesses and 
shortcomings.  After forty years of the pretext analysis, it is time to expel it from 
discrimination law.  Abrogating the McDonnell Douglas analysis should be 
a significant first step in reconsidering the tortification of employment 
discrimination law. 
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“As one wit said:  ‘If the thing speaks for itself, why doesn’t it talk 
in English?’”1 
 
[A]n act of employment discrimination is much more than an 
ordinary font of tort law.  The anti-employment discrimination laws 
are suffused with a public aura for reasons that are well known.  
Throughout this Nation’s history, persons have far too often been 
judged not by their individual merit, but by the fortuity of their race, 
their sex, the color of their skin, or year of their birth, the nation of 
their origin, or the religion of their conscientious choosing.  Congress 
has responded to these pernicious misconceptions and ignoble hatreds 
with humanitarian laws formulated to wipe out the iniquity of 
discrimination in employment, not merely to recompense the 
individuals so harmed but principally to deter future violations. 
 The anti-employment discrimination laws Congress enacted 
consequently resonate with a forceful public policy vilifying 
discrimination.  A plaintiff in an employment discrimination case 
accordingly acts not only to vindicate his or her personal interests in 
being made whole, but also as a “private attorney general” to enforce 
the paramount public interest in eradicating invidious 
discrimination.2 
INTRODUCTION 
What if I told you that the most important analytical framework in 
employment discrimination law is nothing more than a thinly veiled 
pretext for one of the most enigmatic, vexatious, and controversial 
doctrines of tort law?  If I told you that the most basic and prevalent 
analysis in antidiscrimination law really is one of the most distrusted 
and marginalized analyses in tort law, would you be troubled?  What 
                                                            
 1. Stemme v. Siedhoff, 427 S.W.2d 461, 465 (Mo. 1968). 
 2. Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1234 (3d Cir. 1994), 
vacated by 514 U.S. 1034 (1995). 
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if I told you that the ubiquitous pretext analysis derived from 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green3 is actually a slightly retrofitted 
version of res ipsa loquitur?  Would you think that the very 
foundational analysis of employment discrimination law had been 
based on the best tort law had to offer or its dregs?  This revelation 
might help explain why current employment discrimination analysis 
is confused and discredited.4  Perhaps employment discrimination 
law should be detortified, at least in part, by returning res ipsa loquitur 
to tort law, and thus permitting employment discrimination to speak 
for itself without the artificial contortions of an ill-fitting analysis.  
Employment discrimination law should abandon its most 
                                                            
 3. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  The three-stage analysis, proof structure, or proof 
framework for analyzing employment discrimination claims of intentional disparate 
treatment was announced by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas, id. at 802.  
The McDonnell Douglas analysis also is commonly referred to as the pretext analysis.  
Since 1973, the McDonnell Douglas analysis has become pervasive in employment 
discrimination law and beyond.  A Westlaw search indicates that from January 1, 2011 
to June 1, 2012, the case was cited in 3280 opinions in the federal courts and 202 
opinions in state courts (search terms:  “‘McDonnell Douglas’ w/10 Green” with date 
restriction).  It is used for Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).  Although the Supreme 
Court has not definitively held that the McDonnell Douglas analysis applies to the 
ADEA and the ADA, it has recognized, without disapproval, that the courts of appeals 
apply the analysis in those contexts.  See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 
44, 49 n.3 (2003) (recognizing that the courts of appeals have used the analysis to 
evaluate summary judgment motions in disparate treatment claims and applying it 
under the ADA); O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311 (1996) 
(reserving the issue in context of the ADEA, but evaluating the case pursuant to the 
framework).  The McDonnell Douglas framework also is commonly adopted by courts 
to analyze claims under state employment discrimination laws.  See, e.g., Zaniboni v. 
Mass. Trial Court, 961 N.E.2d 155, 158 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012) (stating that the 
analysis applies to claims under Massachusetts employment discrimination law), cert. 
granted, 967 N.E.2d 634 (Mass. 2012).  Beyond employment discrimination law, the 
pretext analysis has been adopted to analyze other types of federal and state 
employment claims.  See, e.g., Sabourin v. Univ. of Utah, 676 F.3d 950, 958 (10th Cir. 
2012) (applying analysis to retaliation claim under the Family and Medical Leave 
Act); Eagen v. Comm’n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 42 A.3d 478, 487 n.5 
(Conn. App. Ct. 2012) (recognizing adoption of pretext analysis for various types of 
state employment law claims). 
 4. Attorney Carter G. Phillips, in oral argument before the Supreme Court, 
expressed the complexity of the employment discrimination proof structures:  “I will 
say in 25 years of advocacy before this Court I have not seen one area of the law that 
seems to me as difficult to sort out as this particular one is.” Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 29, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (No. 08-441); see 
also Martha Chamallas, Title VII’s Midlife Crisis:  The Case of Constructive Discharge, 77 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 307, 307, 309 (2004) (stating that the statutes do not define 
“discrimination,” that “Title VII law has never been easy,” and that “[a]fter more 
than a decade of litigation under the revised [1991] Act, . . . Title VII law has never 
been more complex and confusing”); Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination 
Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 71 (2011) [hereinafter Sperino, Rethinking] (positing that 
the rigid proof structures that control employment discrimination law have “led to 
doctrinal, procedural, and theoretical confusion within employment discrimination 
law and . . . mired the field in endless questions about frameworks rather than in 
addressing the field’s core issues”). 
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fundamental analysis—the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis; this 
monumental step would immeasurably improve employment 
discrimination law.  It also might provide an impetus to consider the 
larger issue of whether transplanted tort law has become too 
prevalent in employment discrimination law and has eroded to some 
extent the original public policy and civil rights foundations of that 
body of law. 
Almost half a century ago, Congress began enacting federal statutes 
intended to address one of the most important civil rights issues—
employment discrimination.  Given the history of discrimination in 
this nation, it would be difficult to imagine a more important public 
policy.5  However, Congress largely left to the courts the task of 
fleshing out the lean statutory language with doctrine and principles 
regarding proof of violations.6  With such a mission, courts could 
create legal principles and doctrine out of whole cloth or they could 
turn to existing bodies of law to borrow principles and doctrines,7 
                                                            
 5. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 87-1370, at 2 (1962) (“Clear enunciation and 
implementation of a national policy on equal employment opportunity are obviously 
long overdue at this point in the history of the United States.”); Cheryl Krause 
Zemelman, Note, The After-Acquired Evidence Defense to Employment Discrimination 
Claims:  The Privatization of Title VII and the Contours of Social Responsibility, 46 STAN. L. 
REV. 175, 189 (1993) (“Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in an attempt to 
assuage a national crisis. . . .  Recognizing that discrimination injured the country as 
a whole, Congress passed Title VII to achieve broad social goals.”).  There may be no 
more eloquent statement of the objectives of Title VII than that proclaimed by the 
Third Circuit in Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1234.  See supra text accompanying note 2. 
 6. For an interesting discussion of Congress’s delegation of the interpretive role 
for Title VII to the courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC), see Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate:  
Judicial and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363 (2010).  Professor 
Lemos discusses the political battle over whether the principal interpretive role 
would be delegated to the courts or the EEOC.  She notes that ultimately Congress 
weakened the enforcement authority of the new EEOC and therefore delegated a 
larger interpretive role to the courts.  Id. at 385–86.  Professor Suzanna Sherry posits 
that when Congress does not supply factual underpinnings for legislation in either 
the statutes or the legislative history, the Supreme Court supplies the foundational 
assumptions that inform the implementing doctrines.  See Suzanna Sherry, 
Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 145, 161. 
 7. However, resort to common law sources is not necessarily an apt choice.  See 
Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law, and Proximate Cause, 2013 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 34 [hereinafter Sperino, Discrimination Statutes] (“[I]t is unclear why 
judges would look to the common law to define terms in a statutory regime that is 
not generally drawn from the common law and that does not mimic the common law 
. . . .”); cf. Robert Belton, Causation in Employment Discrimination Law, 34 WAYNE L. 
REV. 1235, 1242 (1988) (“Since the national policy against discrimination in 
employment is not based on the common law, a strong argument can be made that 
causal analysis should not be as critical an element in employment discrimination law 
as it is in the law of negligence.” (footnotes omitted)).  The propriety and balance of 
importing common law doctrines to develop law under the employment 
discrimination statutes is a topic that merits separate treatment.  For now, it is 
important to note that courts should recognize some tension, and in some cases, 
incongruence of purpose between some common law principles and employment 
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making adjustments to adapt the transplanted law to the objective of 
combating employment discrimination.  In practice, the courts both 
created and borrowed.8  The courts had several options of substantive 
bodies of law from which to borrow principles and adapt them to the 
law of employment discrimination, including contract, constitutional, 
agency, property, and tort law.  While courts have imported doctrine 
and principles from several bodies of law,9 courts have most often 
turned to tort law.10 
Although many of the concepts, principles, and doctrines of tort 
law have proven useful in the context of employment discrimination, 
it is important to balance the different objectives of tort law on the 
one hand with the goals of public policy statutes such as the laws 
addressing employment discrimination on the other.11  Some torts 
                                                            
discrimination law.  Indeed, some common law principles will be antithetical to 
employment discrimination law.  For example, Professor Richard Epstein recognizes 
that the employment discrimination laws are diametrically opposed to the common-
law based principle of employment at will.  See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN 
GROUNDS:  THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 3 (1992).  
Commentators have made the case against a common law “baseline” for employment 
discrimination law.  See, e.g., Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Reagan 
Court and Title VII:  A Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1, 70 
(1990) (discussing the “inherent[] inconsist[ency]” of survival of “common-law 
economic and political premises in light of a statutory scheme” that significantly 
impinges on employment at will). 
 8. Regarding the courts’ creation of new law, consider for example, the 
development of the disparate impact theory of employment discrimination.  See infra 
Part I.B. 
 9. See, e.g., Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of American 
Work Law, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 163, 171 (2007) (noting “the ‘background’ 
rules of contract, tort, and property [that] have emerged to play a vital role in the 
application of the statutes and doctrines that govern employment discrimination . . . 
cases”).  For example, the Supreme Court has used agency law principles in 
determining when employers should be liable for sexual harassment.  See Burlington 
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 
U.S. 57 (1986).  In developing a proof structure for cases involving direct evidence of 
discrimination, the Court turned to the mixed-motives framework developed in the 
context of a public employee’s asserting a violation of first amendment rights.  Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 229 (1989) (plurality opinion) (adopting the 
framework developed in Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 
274 (1977)).  As will be discussed below, however, one of the most divisive issues in 
the splintered Price Waterhouse decision was the standard of causation, and that issue 
prompted debate about various tort standards of causation that could be 
incorporated in the Mt. Healthy analysis.  See infra Part I.D. 
 10. See, e.g., Michael J. Frank, The Social Context Variable in Hostile Environment 
Litigation, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 437, 519 (2002) (stating that “the courts have 
frequently looked to common-law tort doctrines to create the common law of Title VII”). 
 11. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 72 (adapting agency law principles to 
employer liability for sexual harassment, the Court noted that “such common-law 
principles may not be transferable in all their particulars to Title VII”); see also David 
Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating:  Title VII Liability of Employers for 
the Sexual Harassment Committed by Their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 66, 93 (1995) 
(contending that “[s]exual harassment is not merely a common-law tort, such as 
assault, battery, defamation, or intentional infliction of emotional distress; it is also a 
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concepts and principles might work well if modified, while still others 
might not be sufficiently adaptable.  Thus, courts should have 
exercised caution in adopting elements of tort law that are not 
adaptable to the law of employment discrimination.12  Almost fifty 
years after the enactment of the first antidiscrimination law, case law 
has imported a large volume of torts principles and doctrine, 
including the principles of cause in fact, proximate cause, and res 
ipsa loquitur.13  More important than the volume is the centrality of 
imported tort law in the corpus of employment discrimination law.  
For example, much of the core of individual disparate treatment 
law—the most important theory of employment discrimination 
law14—is founded on torts standards of causation and the res ipsa 
loquitur doctrine.15  Indeed, the Supreme Court recently starkly 
declared in Staub v. Proctor Hospital16 that an employment 
discrimination statute is a federal tort.17  The Staub Court then 
proceeded to adopt one of the most complicated and criticized 
principles of tort law as the standard to resolve the common 
employment discrimination issue presented in the case.18 
Over the years, some scholars have questioned whether the 
“tortification” of employment discrimination law is an appropriate 
evolution for a body of civil rights and public policy law.19  Now it is 
important to consider whether this body of law has become too 
dominated by imported tort law that has been insufficiently adapted 
to achieve the public policy purposes of the employment 
discrimination statutes.  While the Court’s recent proclamation in 
Staub that an employment discrimination statute is a federal statutory 
tort and its consequent incorporation of more tort doctrine have 
                                                            
statutory wrong for which Congress has provided free government investigations, 
federal jurisdiction, and attorneys’ fees as well as legal damages”). 
 12. Professor Sperino distinguishes between importation of “pure common law” 
and common law doctrine that is adjusted to the particular employment 
discrimination law.  See Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note 7, at 45. 
 13. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 14. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) 
(declaring that “[u]ndoubtedly disparate treatment was the most obvious evil 
Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII”). 
 15. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 16. 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011). 
 17. Id. at 1191. 
 18. Id. at 1192 (determining that a supervisor’s act must be the proximate cause 
of the adverse employment action for his discriminatory intent to be attributed to the 
employer when a subsequent decisionmaker implements the adverse employment 
action). 
 19. See, e.g., Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note 7, at 2; Charles A. Sullivan, 
Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1431, 1434 (2012) [hereinafter 
Sullivan, Tortifying]; Zemelman, supra note 5, at 177. 
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captured the attention and concern of employment discrimination 
scholars, it is just the latest occurrence in the ongoing and escalating 
tortification.20  It follows just two years after the Court in Gross v. FBL 
Financial Services, Inc.,21 to the surprise of many, rejected application 
of the mixed-motives proof framework under the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act and concomitantly entrenched but-for causation, 
the most plaintiff-hostile torts cause-in-fact standard in general use, as 
the interpretation of the statutory language “because of . . . age.”22 
The McDonnell Douglas analysis, one of employment discrimination 
law’s oldest and most firmly established doctrines, has never been 
impugned for its “tortiness.”  While it has been the subject of 
extensive criticism,23 the tort lineage of the McDonnell Douglas 
framework rarely has been discussed in scholarly criticism.24  This 
Article argues that the McDonnell Douglas pretext proof structure is a 
thinly veiled version of res ipsa loquitur,25 and that fact is significant 
                                                            
 20. See Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note 7, at 17; Sullivan, Tortifying, 
supra note 19, at 1432–34. 
 21. 557 U.S. 167 (2009). 
 22. Id. at 180.  Gross is discussed infra Part I.D. 
 23. Criticism of McDonnell Douglas is almost as ubiquitous and unabating over the 
years as use of the framework itself is in the case law.  See, e.g., Judith Olans Brown et 
al., Some Thoughts About Social Perception and Employment Discrimination Law:  A Modest 
Proposal for Reopening the Judicial Dialogue, 46 EMORY L.J. 1487, 1527 n.182 (1997) 
(agreeing with the premise that the Court abandon the McDonnell Douglas analysis); 
Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Getting It Right:  Uncertainty and Error in the New Disparate 
Treatment Paradigm, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1, 5 (1996) (suggesting the Court should 
reconsider using the McDonnell Douglas analysis and offering suggestions for 
alternative methodologies); Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-Shifting 
Approach in Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 703, 704–05 (1995) 
(describing criticism of the McDonnell Douglas analysis as the Court’s usurping the 
role of Congress); Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet:  Disparate Treatment After 
Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2259 (1995) (discussing the shortfalls of the McDonnell 
Douglas analysis in addressing discrimination); George Rutherglen, Reconsidering 
Burdens of Proof:  Ideology, Evidence, and Intent in Individual Claims of Employment 
Discrimination, 1 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 43, 43–44 (1993) (describing the decreasing 
significance of the McDonnell Douglas analysis); Stephen W. Smith, Title VII’s National 
Anthem:  Is There a Prima Facie Case for the Prima Facie Case?, 12 LAB. LAW. 371, 371 
(1997) (exploring whether the McDonnell Douglas analysis is useful). 
 24. Current scholarly discussions are focusing on other tortifications of 
employment discrimination law but not the McDonnell Douglas framework.  See, e.g., 
Sperino, Rethinking, supra note 4; Sullivan, Tortifying, supra note 19. 
 25. See Burns v. AAF-McQuay, Inc., 96 F.3d 728, 732 (4th Cir. 1996) (describing 
the McDonnell Douglas analysis as “a cousin of res ipsa loquitur”); Robert Brookins, 
Hicks, Lies, and Ideology:  The Wages of Sin Is Now Exculpation, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 
939, 982 n.258 (1995) (stating that “[t]he pretextual channel resembles the res ipsa 
loquitur model in the law of torts”); William R. Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave and the 
Desert Palace, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1549, 1564 (2005); Ruth Gana Okediji, Status Rules as 
Discrimination in a Post-Hicks Environment, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 49, 85 (1998) 
(observing that “the Hicks majority’s explanation of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine 
procedural framework strongly echoes the res ipsa loquitur procedural framework”); 
Sherry, supra note 6, at 164 (stating that “McDonnell Douglas essentially applies the 
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because it is a tort doctrine that perhaps never should have been 
imported into employment discrimination law.  Regardless of the 
propriety of the importation of res ipsa loquitur into employment 
discrimination law in 1973, courts have not adequately modified the 
McDonnell Douglas framework to serve the public policy objectives 
behind the employment discrimination laws.  Moreover, “res ipsa 
McDonnell Douglas,” which is based on the persuasiveness of 
assumptions supporting an inference, has not been substantially or 
adequately revised over its forty-year life to reflect changes in the 
occurrence of discrimination in the workplace or changes in societal 
views about the occurrence of employment discrimination.  Thus, 
using analysis akin to res ipsa loquitur in employment discrimination 
law has become not just unhelpful, but an impediment to proving 
discrimination in many disparate treatment claims and an obstacle to 
improving and updating the analytical tools of employment 
discrimination law. 
With the tortification of employment discrimination law having 
reached a new level of audacity in Staub v. Proctor Hospital, now is an 
opportune time to unmask McDonnell Douglas as almost unexpurgated 
tort law that has been foisted upon employment discrimination law.  
Notwithstanding its pervasiveness and popularity with the courts, the 
res ipsa loquitur of employment discrimination law has not yet 
achieved statutory enshrinement,26 although future codification is by 
no means farfetched.27  If the tort origins and foundations of the 
pretext analysis could be used to undermine it while it is common-law 
based, such a monumental development might advance a dialogue 
about the larger topic of importing tort law into employment 
discrimination law.28  While employment discrimination law still 
                                                            
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to employment discrimination:  merely failing to hire 
(or firing) speaks for itself as evidence of discriminatory intent”). 
 26. See Sperino, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 105 (stating that “McDonnell Douglas is 
not codified in any statutory language”). 
 27. Consider, for example, the Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination 
Act, the legislation introduced in 2009 and again in 2012 to overturn Gross v. FBL 
Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009).  S. 2189, 112th Cong. (2012); S. 1756, 
111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 3721, 111th Cong. (2009).  The bills would have codified 
the McDonnell Douglas evidentiary framework by providing that plaintiffs asserting 
employment discrimination claims under Title VII, the ADEA, the ADA and the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 “may demonstrate an unlawful practice through any 
available method of proof, including the analytical framework set out in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green.”  S. 2189 § 2(b)(3)(C). 
 28. Commentators referring to the “tortification” of employment discrimination 
law almost invariably are using the term in a pejorative sense, but there is much 
about tort law that is good and useful.  Cf. RED HOT CHILI PEPPERS, Californication, on 
CALIFORNICATION (Warner Bros. Records 1999).  The adoption and adaptation of tort 
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retains some of its civil rights and public policy aura, it is time to 
reclaim some of that ground by acknowledging that tort principles 
and constructs should not so readily be imported into employment 
discrimination law. 
Part I of this Article discusses the changing perception of the 
employment discrimination laws—how and why the laws have come 
to be viewed as federal torts.  Part I also considers some of the 
incorporations of tort law into employment discrimination law that 
have constituted the “tortification” of the law.  Part II critically 
examines the McDonnell Douglas or pretext analysis as an adoption of 
res ipsa loquitur.  Part II then contrasts that adoption of tort law with 
more innovative employment discrimination principles, standards, 
and proof frameworks created by the Supreme Court and Congress.  
Part III proposes the abrogation of the “res ipsa McDonnell Douglas” 
analysis’s dominance in employment discrimination law.  That part 
demonstrates how poorly res ipsa loquitur accommodates analysis of 
employment discrimination claims.  Res ipsa loquitur means, “the 
thing speaks for itself,” but by using this analysis in employment 
discrimination cases, courts are letting an ill-fitting tort doctrine 
“speak for” employment discrimination law.  Courts should strip away 
the tort pretext to truly let employment discrimination speak for 
itself.  Casting off McDonnell Douglas’s vexing analysis, which is itself a 
mere pretext for res ipsa loquitur, would be a good first step in 
reversing the almost haphazard tortification of employment 
discrimination law. 
I. THE TORTIFICATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 
A. Staub—Tortification of Employment Discrimination Law Reaches 
its Zenith 
When Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196429 was enacted, 
neither Congress nor the Supreme Court would have characterized 
the federal employment discrimination law as a statutory tort.  Title 
VII was primarily a public policy and civil rights statute aimed at 
eradicating, in the employment setting, the most socially caustic and 
destructive forms of discrimination that had blighted the nation 
                                                            
law in employment discrimination law has not always been bad, and future 
incorporations need not be bad. 
 29. Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 
2000e-17 (2006)). 
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throughout its history.30  Since early in the employment 
discrimination law era, however, the courts, and to a lesser extent 
Congress, have vigorously infused discrimination law with the 
principles of tort law.31  During its 2011-2012 Term, the Supreme 
Court moved farther down the road of re-conceptualizing the 
federal employment discrimination laws as federal torts rather than 
broad public policy statements regarding civil rights.  In Staub, the 
Court, adopting a standard for subordinate bias or “cat’s paw” 
liability,32 stated that “when Congress creates a federal tort it adopts 
the background of general tort law.”33  Although the Court was 
analyzing the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment 
Rights Act of 199434 (USERRA), the Court clearly was suggesting 
that Title VII and the other employment discrimination laws are 
federal torts as well.35 
                                                            
 30. See supra note 5 and accompanying text; see also Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 
441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979) (stating that “the ADEA and Title VII share a common 
purpose, the elimination of discrimination in the workplace”); H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, 
pt. 1, at 18 (1963) (stating Title VII’s purpose to eliminate discrimination). 
 31. It is interesting to note that this importation of law is not a one-way street.  
Professor Martha Chamallas writes of the “degree to which the concepts and values 
of civil rights law have migrated or can be expected to migrate into tort law.”  Martha 
Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage:  The Migration from Civil Rights to Tort Law, 48 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 2118 (2007). 
 32. The Court explained the issue as follows:  “[plaintiff] sought to hold his 
employer liable for the animus of a supervisor who was not charged with making the 
ultimate employment decision.”  Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1190 
(2011).  The Court also explained the origin of the term “cat’s paw.”  Id. at 1190 n.1 
(noting that the term arose from a fable written by Aesop in which a monkey induces 
a cat by flattery to take roasting chestnuts from a fire and, when the cat burns its 
paws, the monkey runs off with the chestnut). 
 33. Id. at 1191. 
 34. Pub. L. No. 103-353, 108 Stat. 3149 (codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4334 
(2006)). 
 35. The principle that the Court was discussing in Staub, subordinate bias liability 
or cat’s paw liability, is a general discrimination issue that arises under all of the 
employment discrimination laws.  The USERRA case appears to have served as a 
vehicle to resolve the issue for employment discrimination law generally.  But see 
Holliday v. Commonwealth Brands, Inc., 483 F. App’x 917, 922 n.2 (5th Cir. Aug. 3, 
2012) (per curiam) (suggesting that when Staub is considered in conjunction with 
Gross, the Staub standard may apply to only employment discrimination statutes with 
“motivating factor” statutory language), petition for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3393 (U.S. 
Dec. 20, 2012) (No. 12-764).  Prior to Staub, the Court had granted certiorari to 
resolve the issue several years earlier in a Title VII case that settled before the Court’s 
decision.  See BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A. v. EEOC, 549 U.S. 1334, 1334 
(2007).  Moreover, among the three cases the Staub Court cited in support of the 
federal tort proposition, one was a Title VII case:  Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 
U.S. 742 (1998).  Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1191.  The Court had not actually called Title 
VII a federal tort in Ellerth; rather, the Court said, “Title VII borrows from tort law the 
avoidable consequences doctrine.”  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764. 
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The brazen statement in Staub was not the first time that the Court 
has made such a statement about employment discrimination laws.36  
Indeed, Justice O’Connor in her concurring opinion in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,37 referred to Title VII as creating a “statutory 
employment ‘tort.’”38  Even more telling than the Court’s use of the 
tort label in Staub was the Court’s adoption of the tort concept of 
proximate cause, one of the most maligned principles of tort law39 as 
the test for deciding when to attribute the discriminatory motive of a 
subordinate to a superior.40  The Court had little reason to invoke 
proximate cause in Staub.41  More broadly, proximate cause seems an 
unusual concept to invoke in employment discrimination law.42  
While the cause-in-fact tort standards have created numerous 
problems in employment discrimination law, the nebulous concept of 
                                                            
 36. See Sullivan, Tortifying, supra note 19, at 1433 (“Although Title VII has often 
been described as creating a statutory tort, the panoply of tort doctrines has been 
applied to this statutory scheme only sporadically and then often in forms influenced 
by specific statutory language of the law.” (footnote omitted)). 
 37. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 38. Id. at 264 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (sorting through torts 
standards of causation to choose one for the mixed-motives analysis).  As Professor 
Bernstein chronicles, Justice O’Connor was the primary proponent of the thesis that 
employment discrimination law is statutory tort law.  Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual 
Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 510 (1997) (stating that “her 
colleagues on the Court have never effectively refuted Justice O’Connor’s cogent 
position that employment discrimination is a tort in all but name”). 
 39. Dean Mark Grady, in the course of offering a defense of proximate cause for 
its greater-than-appreciated predictability and cohesiveness, recognized that many 
believe that proximate cause is basically incoherent and that its cases either cannot 
be predicted or that they illustrate some fundamental disorder of the common law.  
See Mark F. Grady, Proximate Cause Decoded, 50 UCLA L. REV. 293, 294 (2002); see also 
Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note 7, at 4 (quoting a leading torts treatise 
regarding the disagreement and confusion about proximate cause); Sullivan, 
Tortifying, supra note 19, at 1459 (stating that “[c]omplaints about the nebulousness 
of the concept are numerous and longstanding, and there have been determined 
efforts to eradicate it from legal discourse”). 
 40. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1187 (citing proximate cause as key to determining 
liability).  Many have decried the complexity, uncertainty, and other negative 
qualities of proximate cause.  Indeed, the dissatisfaction with proximate cause has 
been so great that the Restatement (Third) of Torts replaces “proximate cause” with 
“scope of liability,” explaining that proximate cause is a poor term to describe the 
idea embodied in the term.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 cmt. b (2010). 
 41. Sullivan, Tortifying, supra note 19, at 1455–58 (noting that regarding the 
result in Staub, the invocation of proximate cause seems gratuitous). 
 42. Sullivan notes three reasons:  (1) Proximate cause is “a notoriously 
amorphous concept even in those areas in which it applies”; (2) proximate cause in 
torts applies to negligence not intentional torts, and disparate treatment denotes 
intentional discrimination; and (3) tort law has used proximate cause primarily for 
physical injuries, not economic injuries.  See id. at 1459.  Even a commentator who is 
generally favorable about Staub recognizes the uncertainty the Court left in its wake.  
See Benjamin Pepper, Comment, Staub v. Proctor Hospital:  A Tenuous Step in the 
Right Direction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 363, 367 (2012). 
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proximate cause seems likely to be even more problematic.  What 
role will proximate cause concepts such as foreseeability, direct 
causation, scope of the risk, eggshell skull, and intervening and 
superseding cause have in employment discrimination law?  As 
troublesome as proximate cause has been in tort law, its adoption in 
employment discrimination law does not bode well.  It is difficult to 
foresee where the adoption of proximate cause in employment 
discrimination law will lead.43   
Although the Court’s treatment of employment discrimination law 
in Staub has been provocative,44 it is just the latest step in the ongoing 
transformation of the employment discrimination statutes into 
federal statutory torts.  However, Staub represents a significant step 
because the Court both unequivocally declared an employment 
discrimination statute to be a tort and adopted one of the most 
vexatious of all tort doctrines to address a common employment 
discrimination issue. 
B. In the Beginning 
The tortification of employment discrimination law was not 
imminent when the Supreme Court began interpreting Title VII and 
developing the law.  The 1971 case, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,45 marked 
the Supreme Court’s first significant encounter with Title VII.46  The 
Griggs Court adopted disparate impact, an innovative theory of 
discrimination advocated by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission.47  Under the theory, facially nondiscriminatory 
employment practices and criteria that have a statistically significant 
disparate impact on members of a protected class constitute illegal 
discrimination, regardless of intent, if they cannot be justified by 
                                                            
 43. Professor Sullivan posits that the Court may have been preparing to hold that 
unconscious discrimination is not actionable because such discrimination does not 
cause the harm.  Sullivan, Tortifying, supra note 19, at 1459.  Professor Sperino 
predicts that “importing proximate cause principles into employment discrimination 
law will further limit the reach of federal discrimination law, in line with already 
conservative interpretations of factual causation.”  Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, 
supra note 7, at 3. 
 44. See, e.g., Sullivan, Tortifying, supra note 19, at 1445–58; Sperino, Discrimination 
Statutes, supra note 7, at 43. 
 45. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 46. The Court decided one Title VII case before Griggs:  Phillips v. Martin Marietta 
Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).  The per curiam opinion reversed a 
summary judgment on the issue of whether women not having preschool age 
children was a bona fide occupational qualification for a job.  Id. at 543–44. 
 47. See generally Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate 
Impact Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251 (2011) (examining the history of Title VII 
disparate impact law). 
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their relationship and necessity to the job in question.48  Although it 
has been argued that the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) created the disparate impact theory,49 Professor 
Carle, in an insightful article, has traced the origins of the theory to 
activists within the National Urban League who developed 
“experimentalist regulatory strategies” in the early 1900s.50  No one 
disputes, however, that the agency charged with enforcement of Title 
VII played a major role in the development of and advocacy for 
disparate impact,51 a legal theory that was not borrowed from tort law 
or any other obvious common law source.  In adopting the disparate 
impact theory, the Court spoke in eloquent language about the 
purpose of Title VII to combat both overt and covert forms of 
discrimination.52  Through these observations, the Court noted the 
lofty objective of Title VII.53 
In contrast with the later adoptions and minor modifications of 
tort law, disparate impact was innovative and expansive law, and it has 
been controversial.  Indeed, it was so innovative that some argue that 
the Court reached beyond Congressional intent in enacting Title 
VII.54  However, arguments regarding disparate impact’s questionable 
lineage and its alleged inconsistency with Congressional intent were 
rendered moot by Congress’s codification of a version of disparate 
impact in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.55 
                                                            
 48. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).  
The definition and framework for disparate impact were codified in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006). 
 49. See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA:  ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1960–1972, at 249–54 (1990) (describing how the EEOC 
initiated the interpretation of Title VII that the Court adopted in Griggs).  But see 
Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty:  A Brief Look at the Birth, Death, and Resurrection of the 
Disparate Impact Theory of Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 431, 435 (2005) 
(refuting proposition that the EEOC created the disparate impact theory). 
 50. See Carle, supra note 47, at 270–74. 
 51. See Lemos, supra note 6, at 398–99 (discussing the Court’s reliance on the 
EEOC’s guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures). 
 52. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (noting that Title VII 
“proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but 
discriminatory in operation”). 
 53. See id. (“What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, 
and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to 
discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification.”). 
 54. See EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 254–55 (arguing that the “disparate impact 
theory” came out of the blue); Lemos, supra note 6, at 399 n.155 (stating that “[f]ans 
and opponents of Griggs tend to agree that the decision is difficult to square with the 
available indications of congressional intent”). 
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006).  Although the battle about disparate impact’s 
past is merely academic, the threat to its future viability is real, with both 
commentators and a Supreme Court Justice positing that the disparate impact theory 
may violate the Equal Protection Clause.  Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594 
(2009) (Scalia, J., concurring); Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate 
CORBETT.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2013  1:10 PM 
2013] UNMASKING A PRETEXT FOR RES IPSA LOQUITOR 461 
After Griggs was decided in 1971, one might have forecast that the 
Court would develop the law of Title VII by being creative and 
fashioning a new body of employment discrimination principles 
rather than relying heavily on those imported from the common 
law.56  However, the creative impulse exhibited in Griggs was short-
lived and both the Supreme Court and Congress soon began to 
tortify employment discrimination law.  The Court’s second 
significant encounter with Title VII was in 1973 in McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green.57 
C. The Changing Perception of the Employment Discrimination Laws 
The tortification of employment antidiscrimination law can be 
viewed in two ways.  First and more generally is the changing 
perception of the laws.  Second and more specifically is the 
incorporation of specific tort concepts, doctrines, and principles into 
antidiscrimination law with no, few, or inadequate modifications. 
The first statements by justices on the Supreme Court analogizing 
Title VII to torts and expressly adopting tort standards came in 1989 
in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.58  Before considering the incorporation 
of specific tort doctrines into employment discrimination law, it is 
instructive to consider changing views of the employment 
discrimination laws that have made resort to tort law seem apt and 
natural.  One view of the statutes is that they are manifestations of 
public policy regarding civil rights, which attempt to eradicate and 
deter the societal wrong of employment discrimination.59  While 
compensation of individual victims’ personal injuries is an 
appropriate goal of public policy and civil rights laws, it is not the 
                                                            
Impact:  Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 585–87 (2003); see also Eang L. Ngov, 
When “The Evil Day” Comes, Will Title VII’s Disparate Impact Provision Be Narrowly Tailored 
to Survive an Equal Protection Clause Challenge?, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 535, 588 (2011) 
(concluding that disparate impact’s means of achieving its goals are not sufficient to 
satisfy the narrow-tailoring requirement). 
 56. For further discussion of employment discrimination law crafted by the Court 
rather than imported from common law and tort law, see supra notes 129–30 and 
accompanying text. 
 57. Although none of the critics of the tortification of employment 
discrimination law identify McDonnell Douglas as a significant step in the process, this 
Article argues that it was.  See infra Part II.B. 
 58. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239–42 (1989) (plurality 
opinion). 
 59. See Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1234 (3d Cir. 1994) (“A 
plaintiff in an employment-discrimination case accordingly acts . . . to enforce the 
paramount public interest in eradicating invidious discrimination.”), vacated, 514 
U.S. 1034 (1995). 
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principal objective.60  Another view of the employment discrimination 
laws is that they are essentially federal statutory torts, the primary 
purpose of which is to compensate individuals for the personal 
injuries they suffer as a result of discrimination.61  In the half century 
since the passage of Title VII, the perception of the employment 
discrimination laws among courts, commentators, employers, and the 
general public has moved from the first view toward the second.   
A strong critic of the tortification of employment discrimination 
law, Cheryl Zemelman, expressed her assessment in 1993 that there 
had been a marked shift from viewing Title VII as a statute 
encouraging employer responsibility to prevent discrimination to a 
compensatory statute, focused on repaying victims.62  Thus, Title VII 
had become so privatized “that once unthinkable characterizations of 
the statute now seem commonplace.”63 
How did perception of the employment discrimination laws, a 
group of public policy and civil rights statutes, so evolve?  This 
Section considers three things that either prompted or indicated a 
shift in perception:  (1) the enactment of section 1981a as part of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991; (2) the shift in the most prevalent type of 
claims from those based on refusal to hire to those based on 
termination; and (3) courts’ increasing restrictions on use of the class 
action device in employment discrimination litigation, which has 
been somewhat analogous to the restrictions placed on use of the 
class action for mass torts. 
1. The enactment of § 1981a as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
The enactment of § 1981a64 as part of the Civil Rights Act of 199165 
was a good and needed change in employment discrimination law.  
                                                            
 60. The Court discussed the dual goals of deterrence or eradication of 
discrimination and compensation in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421–
22 (1975).  The Court identified the “primary objective” of Title VII as “achiev[ing] 
equality of employment opportunities and remov[ing] barriers that have operated in 
the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees.”  Id. 
at 417 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1972)).  The Court 
then went on to recognize that “[i]t is also the purpose of Title VII to make persons 
whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.”  Id. 
at 418; see also Zemelman, supra note 5, at 191 (“The primary emphasis on 
deterrence, rather than compensation, is reflected in the language and judicial 
interpretation of Title VII’s backpay provision.”). 
 61. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. 
REV. 917, 985 (2010) (“[L]egislatures enjoy the authority to fashion statutory torts—
relational wrongs that give rise to private rights of action.  This is what statutes like 
Title VII are all about.”). 
 62. Zemelman, supra note 5, at 188, 196. 
 63. Id. 
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006). 
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Nonetheless, that change probably has contributed to the view of the 
employment discrimination laws shifting toward statutory torts.  
Section 1981a made capped compensatory and punitive damages and 
jury trials available for disparate treatment claims under Title VII and 
the Americans with Disabilities Act.66  The enactment of section 
1981a brought more consistency and uniformity to the remedies 
available for various types of discrimination, although the caps 
preserved some of the inequality and inconsistency.67  Before the 
enactment of section 1981a, plaintiffs with race claims had been able 
to seek damages and have jury trials under Section 1981,68 and age 
discrimination plaintiffs had been able to have jury trials and recover 
liquidated damages under the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967 (ADEA).69  Outside of race and age claims, the principal 
monetary remedy available to other employment discrimination 
plaintiffs was backpay.70  Under Title VII, before the 1991 Act, sexual 
harassment plaintiffs who had not lost their jobs would often not have 
recovered money other than attorney’s fees.71  The 1991 Act changed 
                                                            
 65. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213. 
 67. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, at 64–65 (1991) (“An unfair preference exists 
in federal civil rights law.  Current civil rights laws permit the recovery of unlimited 
compensatory and punitive damages in cases of intentional race discrimination. No 
similar remedy exists in cases of intentional gender or religious discrimination.”).  
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, as enacted, included caps on compensatory and 
punitive damages.  This amendment was a compromise to secure its passage.  See S. 
REP. NO. 102-286, at 2–3 (1992) (“In the interest of securing prompt passage of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 . . . Congress accepted the restrictions on damages, and left 
to 1992 the task of providing full, fair, and equal remedies for victims of 
discrimination.”). 
 68. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, at 74 (stating that in providing for damages 
the Act “authorizes damage awards in Title VII cases in the same circumstances as 
such awards are now permitted under 42 U.S.C. section 1981 for intentional race 
discrimination”); see also Michael C. Harper, Eliminating the Need for Caps on Title VII 
Damage Awards:  The Shield of Koldstad v. American Dental Association, 14 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 477, 482 (2011) (stating that “Congress acted to at least mitigate 
the disparity created by this set of legal developments by enacting a new section, 
1981a”); Sandra Sperino, The New Calculus of Punitive Damages for Employment 
Discrimination Cases, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 701, 709 (2010) (“[Section] 1981 provides a 
federal remedy for race discrimination but does not contain the damages caps found 
in Title VII.”). 
 69. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). 
 70. As the Court explained before the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, “a plaintiff in a Title VII action is limited to a recovery of backpay, whereas 
under § 1981 a plaintiff may be entitled to plenary compensatory damages, as well 
as punitive damages in an appropriate case.”  Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 
491 U.S. 164, 182 n.4 (1989). 
 71. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, at 64–69; Harper, supra note 68, at 481 
(stating that Congress saw a need to provide additional remedies “in light of the 
disparity between the legal damages the Court made available for race discrimination 
in private employment through its interpretation of section 1981 and the limited 
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that with the addition of capped compensatory and punitive damages 
and thereby partially rectified a disparity among the types of 
discrimination claims.72  There were very good reasons for Congress 
to enact section 1981a, adding damages and jury trials for 
discrimination claims that previously did not have those features, but 
the addition of the damages also strengthened the compensatory 
objective of the employment discrimination laws.  That change, to 
some, made them seem more tort-like.73   
The Supreme Court suggested as much in a decision regarding the 
taxability of an award of backpay under Title VII.  In United States v. 
Burke,74 the Court stated that “one of the hallmarks of traditional tort 
liability is the availability of a broad range of damages to compensate 
the plaintiff.”75  The Court responded to the argument that the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 changed the remedial provisions and thus made 
Title VII claims “inherently tort-like in nature.”76  The Court 
explained that although the availability of jury trials and 
compensatory damages under the amended Act implies that 
Congress has changed its view of the injury covered by Title VII, that 
change could not be attributed to the pre-amendment statute.77 
Thus, the 1991 Civil Rights Act’s amendment to add damages has 
been viewed as bolstering the compensation objective of the 
employment discrimination laws and making them more tort-like.  
Although this view of the change in Title VII (and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act) wrought by the Civil Rights Act is facile,78 it 
                                                            
equitable relief available for sex and other proscribed forms of employment 
discrimination available under section 706(g) of Title VII”). 
 72. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2(1), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 
(1991) (stating the congressional finding that “additional remedies under Federal 
law are needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the 
workplace”); Chamallas, supra note 31, at 2142 (noting that “[t]he most important 
change came with respect to remedies:  for the first time, Title VII plaintiffs were 
permitted to obtain jury trials and to recover compensatory and punitive damages, in 
addition to monetary awards for backpay”). 
 73. See Zemelman, supra note 5, at 196–97 (positing that “because the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 now directly authorizes compensatory and punitive damages for Title VII 
plaintiffs, numerous lawyers, members of Congress, and executive officers believe 
that Title VII has become a tort statute”). 
 74. 504 U.S. 229 (1992). 
 75. Id. at 235 (ruling on taxability superseded by statute).  The Court found that 
“Congress’ decision to permit jury trials and compensatory and punitive damages 
under the amended Act signals a marked change in its conception of the injury 
redressable by Title VII.”  Id. at 241 n.12. 
 76. Id. at 241 n.12. 
 77. Id. 
 78. It fails to take into account or give proper weight to the following:  (1) the 
dual objectives of the discrimination statutes; (2) the relationship between the two 
objectives:  the availability of compensation enhances deterrence; and (3) the 
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nonetheless seems to have influenced thinking that the employment 
discrimination laws became more tort-like with the enactment of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991. 
2. The shift from claims based on refusal to hire to claims based on 
 termination 
A second development that has contributed to the view that the 
employment discrimination laws have become more tort-like is the 
shift over the years in the type of adverse employment actions 
challenged in a majority of discrimination claims79 and the 
interaction of that change with the predominant employment law 
principle in the United States—employment at will.80  In the first 
years after enactment of Title VII, most claims were based on refusal 
to hire, but over the years the majority of claims have become 
discharge claims.81  That shift should come as no surprise because 
over the years employment opportunities became more open to those 
to whom they had been denied in the past.82  However, the shift from 
claims based on refusal to hire to claims based on terminations 
brought the employment discrimination laws increasingly into 
tension with employment at will, the basic governing principle for 
employment termination in forty-nine of fifty states.83  Employment at 
will provides that absent contractual, statutory, or other restrictions, 
an employer can fire an employee for any reason—“good reason, bad 
reason, or no reason at all.”84  Employment at will is a longstanding, 
                                                            
objective of Congress to address disparities in the remedies available among the 
various types of discrimination. 
 79. Zemelman, supra note 5, at 193–94 (explaining that discrimination claims 
have shifted from challenges to an employer’s failure to hire to challenges to 
promotion or termination decisions). 
 80. See generally Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths:  An Empirical and Economic 
Reassessment of the Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 MO. L. REV. 679, 696–703 (1994) 
(describing adoption of the employment at will doctrine in each of the fifty states, 
although Montana enacted a wrongful discharge law in 1987). 
 81. See, e.g., John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of 
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1015 (1991) (noting that 
“[h]iring charges outnumbered termination charges by 50 percent in 1966, but by 
1985, the ratio had reversed by more than 6 to 1”). 
 82. See Donohue, supra note 81, at 1017 (positing that one possible reason for the 
shift in the kinds of employment discrimination suits is that more women and 
minorities move into better jobs). 
 83. See Scott A. Moss, Where There’s At-Will, There Are Many Ways:  Redressing the 
Increasing Incoherence of Employment At Will, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 295, 343 n.222 (2005) 
(noting that forty-nine states are characterized as employment at will states).  The 
Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act of 1987, which provides 
employees with a cause of action for termination not for “good cause,” removes that 
state from the list, although weakly.  MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914 (2002). 
 84. See Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519–20 (1884) (“All may dismiss 
their employes [sic] at will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no cause or even 
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deeply entrenched, and fundamental principle of employment law in 
the United States.85  When employees are terminated, many believe 
their termination is wrongful or unjustified, they experience it as a 
personal injury, and many want to sue their former employer for 
“wrongful termination” or “wrongful discharge.”  Yet, in a nation 
dominated by employment at will, few plaintiffs can assert viable 
claims for wrongful discharge.86   
While most states recognize a tort denominated as wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy,87 the tort is ill-defined, and it is 
notoriously hard for plaintiffs to recover under the tort theory.88  
Unlike the feckless wrongful discharge tort, the employment 
discrimination laws are the most significant source of legal protection 
against unjust termination in the United States because a plaintiff 
who can allege termination based on race, sex, or age often has a 
viable employment discrimination claim.  Employers, employees, and 
courts understand that the most significant source of legal protection 
against unjust termination in the United States is the employment 
discrimination laws. 
Thus, increasingly the discrimination laws have come to be 
perceived as statutory wrongful discharge torts.89  Moreover, this may 
                                                            
for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong.”), overruled on 
other grounds by Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915); see also Cynthia L. 
Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1655 
(1996) (recognizing the “employer’s presumptive right to fire employees at will—for 
good reason, for bad reason, or for no reason at all”). 
 85. See Clyde W. Summers, Employment At Will in the United States:  The Divine Right 
of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 66 (2000) (“To understand the American 
system, therefore, it is necessary to understand the doctrine of employment at will, its 
fundamental assumptions, and its ambivalence.  More importantly, it is necessary to 
recognize where that fundamental assumption has shaped our labor law.”). 
 86. See Estlund, supra note 84, at 1670 (describing the general problems of the 
wrongful discharge model as grounded in the inherent difficulty of proving a “bad 
motive” of the employer and the inequality of bargaining power between the 
employer and employee). 
 87. See id. at 1662 (explaining that antiretaliation and antidiscrimination 
doctrines are the basis of the “wrongful discharge” doctrine, which, like tort law, 
requires proof of a specific wrong on the part of the employer). 
 88. See J. Wilson Parker, At-Will Employment and the Common Law:  A Modest Proposal 
to De-Marginalize Employment Law, 81 IOWA L. REV. 347, 393–94, 396 (1995) 
(explaining that most states recognize a tort action for abusive discharge in 
contravention of public policy, however, the unclear definition of the tort has 
resulted in several approaches to the public policy justification for tort liability). 
 89. Cf. Timothy J. Coley, Contracts, Custom, and the Common Law:  Towards a 
Renewed Prominence for Contract Law in American Wrongful Discharge Jurisprudence, 24 
BYU J. PUB. L. 193, 208–09 (2010) (stating that Title VII can be viewed as “a 
representative wrongful discharge statute” because “it provides the basis for the most 
commonly-litigated claims related to employment”). 
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have led to a divisive view of the employment discrimination laws—
that the laws bestow job protection on “protected classes.”90 
3. Increasing restrictions on the use of class action device in employment 
discrimination litigation 
A third matter evidencing the changing perception of the 
employment discrimination laws is that the courts increasingly have 
made class action suits difficult to maintain in employment 
discrimination cases.91  This change is roughly analogous to the 
restrictions that the courts have placed on the class action device for 
mass torts,92 and evinces the perspective that employment 
discrimination is, or has become, just another font of tort law.  As 
Professor Selmi explained in 2003: 
 [T]oday the lawsuits have largely become just another variation of 
a tort claim where monetary relief is the principal, and often the 
only, goal of the litigation.  Along with this shift in emphasis has 
come a dramatic change in our perspective on the persistence of 
discrimination.  There is no longer any concerted effort to 
eliminate discrimination; instead, efforts are directed at providing 
monetary compensation for past discrimination without particular 
concern for preventing future discrimination, or even remedying 
past discrimination, through injunctive relief.  For firms, 
                                                            
 90. See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Workplace in a Racially Diverse Society:  Preliminary 
Thoughts on the Role of Labor and Employment Law, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 49, 81 
(1998) (positing that some who regard themselves as non-protected employees may 
believe that protected employees are getting preferential treatment because 
employers must review adverse decisions carefully when dealing with what they 
believe to be protected classes); Estlund, supra note 84, at 1679 (explaining that the 
combination of antidiscrimination laws and at will employment practice may add to 
the tension between what are regarded as protected groups and other employees 
because the latter normally have no recourse against unfair terminations while the 
former likely have a remedy under the antidiscrimination laws).  In reality, Title VII 
covers all races, sexes, etc., but employers and employees perceive the difficulty of 
prevailing in reverse discrimination cases. 
 91. Zemelman, supra, note 5, at 194 (emphasizing that the Supreme Court views 
discrimination not as a wrong against a whole class of persons, but instead as discrete 
acts against an individual, and, while class actions may serve the rights of the 
individuals that would otherwise not seek redress, the Court remains skeptical that 
class actions suits could enforce these public rights). 
 92. See Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059, 1060–
62 (2012) (explaining that the class action device is disfavored for mass torts because 
of problems such as a lack of commonality, a fear of losing autonomy, and a fear of 
depriving due process rights of individuals); Douglas G. Smith, The Intersection of 
Constitutional Law and Civil Procedure:  Review of Wholesale Justice—Constitutional 
Democracy and the Problem of the Class Action Lawsuit (Part II), 104 NW. U. L. REV. 787, 
794–95 (2010) (describing the limitation on class actions for mass torts as based on 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which states that the class action is inappropriate 
where each individual would be affected in different ways, and the constitutional 
principle of autonomy). 
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discrimination, claims are now like accidents—a cost of doing 
business, which necessarily implies that a certain level of 
discrimination will persist. 
 One reason for the change in the nature of the litigation is that 
employment discrimination class actions have evolved into a purely 
private realm with little to no government oversight—indeed, . . . 
with hardly any oversight at all.93 
The increasing restrictions on use of the class action are a 
significant limitation in employment discrimination law.94  If 
employment discrimination is not an individual, isolated, and 
sporadic phenomenon,95 then we would expect claims and litigation 
to involve systemic claims.  Moreover such approaches would be 
needed to address effectively the type and scope of employment 
discrimination that routinely occurs.96  Two theories of 
discrimination, systemic disparate treatment and disparate impact, 
address systemic discrimination.97  The EEOC believes that 
addressing systemic discrimination claims deserves the agency’s focus 
and resources.98  Systemic claims of discrimination often are pursued 
using the class action device, yet courts increasingly have restricted 
the availability of class actions in employment discrimination.99   
                                                            
 93. Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination:  The Nature of Class Action Employment 
Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1251–52 (2003). 
 94. See Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive?, 37 
AKRON L. REV. 813, 813 (2004) (discussing “the increasing skepticism—
particularly among members of the federal judiciary—toward the class action as 
an effective dispute-resolution mechanism in the employment context is 
beginning to take its toll”). 
 95. See Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics:  Toward a Structural 
Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 128 (2003) 
(noting that “discrimination today rarely operates in isolated states of mind; rather, it 
is often influenced, enabled, and even encouraged by the structures, practices, and 
opportunities of the organizations within which groups and individuals work”). 
 96. Id. at 119 (explaining that as distinguished from individual disparate 
treatment theory, systemic claims are often pattern or practice cases because they are 
based on employers’ actions directed at members of a particular group). 
 97. See id. at 119–26 (discussing systemic disparate treatment); id. at 136–44 
(discussing disparate impact); see also Michael J. Zimmer, Wal-Mart v. Dukes:  Taking 
the Protection Out of Protected Classes, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 409, 445–46 (2012) 
(describing the primary differences between the two systemic discrimination 
theories). 
 98. The EEOC launched its systemic initiative in 2006 and its Task Force Report 
discussed its future plans in the EEOC’s 2012–2016 Strategic Plan.  See LESLIE E. 
SILVERMAN ET AL., EEOC, SYSTEMIC TASK FORCE REPORT 19 (2006), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_reports/systemic.cfm. 
 99. See Linda L. Holdeman, Civil Rights in Employment:  The New Generation, 67 
DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 56 (1990) (“The present Court operates from a highly atomistic, 
individualistic view of society. Hence, it can support the claims of a plaintiff such as 
Ann Hopkins in Price Waterhouse but is strongly disinclined to permit the problems of 
racism and sexism to be addressed systemically by either legislation or lower courts. 
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The Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes,100 in which the Court disallowed certification of a sex 
discrimination class of perhaps over a million and a half sales 
associates, is the latest, and perhaps most significant, manifestation of 
the limitation of class actions in employment discrimination law.101  
In Dukes, female sales associates at Wal-Mart stores throughout the 
nation sought class certification for their claims that Wal-Mart 
engaged in intentional discrimination in denying women promotions 
and in suppressing pay of women compared to men.102  In a five-four 
decision, the Supreme Court held that a class action could not be 
certified under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23.103  The 
majority gave several procedural reasons, and one was because class 
actions are not available under Rule 23(b)(2) when claims for 
monetary relief are more than incidental to claims for injunctive or 
declaratory relief.104  The dissent agreed that certification was not 
appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2), but opined that the certification 
might have been possible under 23(b)(3), if not for the majority’s 
finding that the requirements of 23(a) were not satisfied.105  Although 
Dukes was a controversial decision106 and its effect in practice remains 
to be seen, it is the latest evidence of the Court’s restriction on class 
actions in employment discrimination cases.107 
                                                            
Discrimination issues are restricted to one-on-one showdowns, deciding who is right 
and who is wrong.”). 
 100. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 101. See Scott A. Moss & Nantiya Ruan, The Second-Class Class Action:  How Courts 
Thwart Wage Rights by Misapplying Class Action Rules, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 523, 527 (2012) 
(arguing that Dukes has altered the Rule 23(a) commonality requirement from one 
that was a modest burden to one that is now a heavy burden on plaintiffs). 
 102. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2547. 
 103. Id. at 2561. 
 104. Id. at 2560. 
 105. Id. at 2561 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 106. Dukes has both its defenders and its detractors.  Cf. id. at 2561 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring).  Compare Suzanna Sherry, Hogs Get Slaughtered at the Supreme Court, 2011 
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 28 (criticizing plaintiffs’ attempt in Dukes to use the class action 
vehicle to alter substantive employment discrimination law to include both implicit 
bias and structural discrimination), with Melissa Hart, Civil Rights and Systemic Wrongs, 
32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 455, 456 (2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Dukes “brushed aside the systemic nature of the plaintiffs’ claims without 
a word of analysis”), and Zimmer, supra note 97, at 447 (indicating that the Dukes 
decision changed the law of systemic discrimination or at least foreshadowed 
changes that will be made in future cases). 
 107. See Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment Law:  After Wal-Mart 
v. Dukes, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 477, 479 (2011) (stating that the practical 
impact of Dukes is yet to be determined, but it will likely make it more difficult to 
certify a nationwide class).  Notwithstanding Dukes, there may be devices that 
preserve and reinvigorate the availability of the class action in employment 
discrimination, such as certification of a class “with respect to particular issues” 
under Rule 23(c)(4).  See McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 
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The Supreme Court’s limitations on the use of class actions in 
employment discrimination are analogous in some ways to the 
restrictions on use of class actions for mass torts.108  Additionally, 
some judges and commentators are concerned that the employment 
discrimination class action has become too much like the tort class 
action—largely private litigation with little oversight in which the 
principal objective is compensation of the plaintiffs with much less 
attention to deterrence.109  
 Over the half-century since the enactment of Title VII, the courts 
have shifted employment discrimination laws to focus on individual 
personal injury and compensation.  This shift toward tort-like 
application has removed the focus on the public policy behind 
employment discrimination laws—deterring and eradicating 
discrimination.  This shift has resulted in courts, lawyers, and litigants 
viewing the employment discrimination laws as “statutory torts.” 
D. Importation of Tort Doctrines and Principles  
As the general perception of the employment discrimination 
statutes has shifted toward torts, the courts have tortified employment 
discrimination by importing specific tort principles and doctrines 
into discrimination law with varying degrees of modification.  The 
most prevalent, overarching, and practically significant incorporation 
of tort law into antidiscrimination law is the adoption of tort 
standards of causation as the means for understanding, proving and 
analyzing the statutory prohibitions on discrimination. 
The incorporation of tort cause-in-fact was discussed in the various 
opinions of the badly splintered Supreme Court decision in Price 
Waterhouse.110  The focal point of the debate was what causation 
standard was invoked by Title VII’s statutory language “because of . . . 
                                                            
672 F.3d 482, 490–91 (7th Cir. 2012) (permitting class certification in an 
employment discrimination case limited to particular issues under Rule 23(c)(4)), 
cert denied, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012); Hart, supra note 106, at 475 (discussing class 
certification under Rule 23(c)(4)). 
 108. See Smith, supra note 92, at 794–95 (detailing the limitation on class action 
suits in mass torts due to the myriad of legal and factual distinctions among 
individual members of the class in mass torts that make class certification 
inappropriate; as such, mass tort classes are generally unable to show the requisite 
cohesiveness or predominance of common issues); see also Campos, supra note 92, at 
1061 (discussing Dukes in the framework of mass tort class action suits, and noting 
the concerns with litigant autonomy and due process rights). 
 109. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (detailing the changing perception 
of employment discrimination laws). 
 110. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264–66, 282–85 (1989) (plurality 
opinion). 
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race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”111  The plurality rejected 
the idea that “because of” means but for causation.112  The Court, 
borrowing a procedural framework from constitutional law, required 
a two-step process.  First, the plaintiff was required to prove—as the 
prima facie case—that the relevant protected characteristic was a 
motivating factor in the adverse employment decision.  If the plaintiff 
successfully proved the first step, the burden of persuasion then 
shifted to the defendant to prove that it would have taken the same 
action in the absence of a discriminatory motive (the same-decision 
defense).113  The Court first developed this analysis in Mt. Healthy City 
School District Board of Education v. Doyle,114 a case in which a 
terminated public school teacher asserted a First Amendment free 
speech claim.115  The plurality opinion in Price Waterhouse selected 
“motivating factor” as the standard of causation in the plaintiff’s 
prima facie case,116 whereas the Court in Mt. Healthy expressed the 
standard as “‘substantial factor’—or to put it in other words, . . . a 
‘motivating factor.’”117  Justice O’Connor’s influential concurring 
opinion,118 argued that “because of” did mean “but for,” and she was 
not willing to shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant 
employer on the same-decision defense until the plaintiff satisfied a 
more demanding standard of causation at the prima facie case 
stage.119  Thus, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence selected “substantial 
                                                            
 111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
 112. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240 (plurality opinion).  Twenty years later, a 
majority of the Court repudiated the conclusion that “because of” does not mean but 
for.  Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009). 
 113. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244–45 (plurality opinion). 
 114. 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
 115. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 248–49 (plurality opinion).  The Price Waterhouse 
Court also noted that it had approved such an analysis for a claim under the National 
Labor Relations Act in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983).  
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246–47 (plurality opinion).  In Transportation 
Management, the Court approved the National Labor Relations Board’s reliance in 
NLRB v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), on Mt. Healthy in developing its 
analysis of the plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim.  Mt. Healthy, 462 U.S. at 403–04. 
 116. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244–45 (plurality opinion). 
 117. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. 
 118. Appellate courts have relied upon Justice O’Connor’s concurrence to glean a 
rationale for the Court’s application and interpretation of the mixed-motives 
framework.  See, e.g., Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 580 (1st 
Cir. 1999) (explaining that most courts believe that O’Connor’s concurrence is the 
best method for addressing mixed motives cases), abrogated by Desert Palace, Inc. v. 
Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).  But see Recent Cases, Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 
838 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 816 (2003), 116 HARV. L. REV. 
1897, 1903–04 (2003) (arguing that appellate courts have relied on the wrong Price 
Waterhouse opinion when discussing the mixed-motives framework). 
 119. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 266–67 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (explaining that plaintiffs have a high burden of proof at the first stage). 
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factor,” treating it as a higher standard and not subscribing to the 
interchangeability of “motivating factor” and “substantial factor” in 
Mt. Healthy.120  Referring to the “statutory employment ‘tort’ created 
by Title VII,”121 Justice O’Connor turned to torts case law to find a 
suitable basis for shifting the burden of persuasion and relied on 
Summers v. Tice,122 in which the California Supreme Court aided a 
plaintiff shot by one of two hunters who could not prove which 
breach caused the harm by shifting the burden to the defendants to 
prove they did not cause the harm.123  She also cited another torts 
case applying a shifting burden, Kingston v. Chicago & Northwestern 
Railway Co.,124 a case of concurrent sufficient causes, in which one 
cause of the fire damage was the railroad company’s negligence and 
the other was an innocent or unknown cause.125  Thus, the Price 
Waterhouse plurality and Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion 
imported several tort cause-in-fact principles into employment 
discrimination law, offering alternatives to the one-step but-for 
standard. 
The dissent in Price Waterhouse argued that the plurality was 
incorrect, insisting that “because of,” “by any normal understanding,” 
and as used “in everyday speech” does mean but for.126  But for is the 
minimum standard used in common law approaches, the dissent 
noted, citing tort law.127  The dissent then explained that the plurality 
actually did, contrary to its protestations, adopt a but-for causation 
test in two steps.128 
Although the opinions in Price Waterhouse discussed tort causation 
standards, what the Court created was a two-part analysis with a 
shifting burden of persuasion that had no analogue in tort law.  
Moreover, Congress’s subsequent modifications of the mixed-motives 
analysis in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 preserved this burden-shifting 
                                                            
 120. Id. at 265 (noting that Congress intended that plaintiffs show not only that an 
illegitimate criterion be a substantial factor in the employment decision, but that the 
illegitimate criterion actually caused the employment decision). 
 121. Id. at 264.  O’Connor’s concurring opinion followed the “statutory tort” label 
by noting the two primary functions of Title VII:  the deterrence goal related to 
public policy and the compensation or make-whole goal. 
 122. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948). 
 123. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 263 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 124. 211 N.W. 913 (Wis. 1927). 
 125. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 263–64 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 126. Id. at 281 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also id. at 262–63 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (also arguing that the plurality was incorrect in 
assuming that “because of” does not mean “but for”). 
 127. Id. at 282 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS § 9, 265 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 128. Id. at 285. 
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in employment discrimination analysis, which differs from tort law.129  
Congress also selected the ostensibly lower standard of causation—
“motivating factor”—rather than “substantial factor” for the plaintiff’s 
prima facie case that triggers the shift in the burden of persuasion130  
Thus, although the mixed-motives analysis incorporates tort 
causation standards, the two-part analysis is drawn from other sources 
of law, and Congress made adjustments in the statutory mixed-
motives-analysis to accommodate the objectives of Title VII. 
The adoption of tort standards of cause-in-fact in Title VII analysis 
was the most significant tortification of employment discrimination 
law because all analyses of intentional (disparate treatment) 
discrimination focus on causation.131  The Price Waterhouse mixed-
motives analysis was developed with the Court disagreeing about the 
standard of causation to be applied.  Regarding the other principal 
analysis for individual disparate treatment claims, McDonnell 
Douglas/pretext, the Supreme Court has not engaged in a protracted 
debate or discussion about what tort cause-in-fact standard it 
incorporates in pretext cases as it did with mixed-motives.  The Court 
has suggested, however, that the pretext analysis incorporates but-for 
causation.132 
The formula the Court developed for the statutory language 
“because of” provides that discriminatory motive must be the cause-
in-fact of the adverse job action.133  Many scholars have criticized 
this incorporation of tort law cause-in-fact standards into the core of 
intentional discrimination analysis.134  One commentator posits that 
                                                            
 129. See Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note 7, at 17 (explaining that 
employment discrimination diverges from traditional tort law since the employer 
wins only a partial defense to damages if the employer prevails on the second part of 
the factual cause standard). 
 130. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244–45 (plurality opinion) (interpreting 
legislative history of Title VII to require that a covered trait was the motivating factor 
in the employment decision). 
 131. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177–78 (2009) (discussing 
Price Waterhouse and finding that the burden of persuasion in an ADEA disparate-
treatment case is on the plaintiff to prove causation and it never shifts). 
 132. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976) 
(positing that the plaintiff is only required to show that race was a but for cause of 
the discharge). 
 133. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:  A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 
1183 (1995) (noting that the Court’s formulation of “because of” requires triers of 
fact to determine the employer’s mental state when the alleged discrimination 
occurred). 
 134. See, e.g., Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation:  The Interpretation of an Action and the 
Mixed Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 17, 107–08 
(1991) (arguing that the current causation standard is inappropriate in employment 
discrimination cases). 
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the formula is not apt because the analogy to tort causation is 
flawed:  Motives do not cause discriminatory acts; thus, “trying to 
interpret human actions as if they were problems in causation is 
fundamentally misconceived.”135  Similarly, other commentators 
have argued that the causation formula fails to depict how the 
phenomenon of discrimination actually occurs, as it often results 
from unconscious or subtle bias.136  
My critique of the tortification of employment discrimination law 
does not end, however, with the propriety of adoption of tort 
principles.  It is one thing to criticize the Court for the importation of 
tort cause-in-fact standards into employment discrimination law—the 
most important and far-reaching tortification of discrimination law.  
Nonetheless, the cause-in-fact standards are well-established, deeply 
imbedded, and, in fairness, not far removed from the statutory 
language.  So, I do not expect the Supreme Court to adopt a new 
approach to importation of tort law into employment discrimination 
law and consequently abandon the cause-in-fact standards.  However, 
another facet of tortification is the possible modification of tort 
concepts either at the time of adoption or over time to better achieve 
the objectives of employment discrimination law.  Even if one lauds 
or accepts the Court’s adoption of cause-in-fact standards, the Court’s 
trajectory in developing and adjusting cause-in-fact law in 
employment discrimination has been far less impressive. 
The most basic tort cause-in-fact standard, and the most onerous 
for torts plaintiffs to satisfy, is but for causation.137  What emerged 
from Price Waterhouse was a proof framework that, as the dissent 
demonstrated, maintained but for causation.138  The shifting burden 
of persuasion, however, was an innovative adjustment, which enabled 
the plaintiff to move forward and even win the case by proving a 
lower standard of causation at the prima facie case stage, subject to 
                                                            
 135. Id. at 20. 
 136. See Green, supra note 95, at 131 (arguing that focusing on causation places 
the emphasis on the individual rather than on the workplace environment); Krieger, 
supra note 133, at 1168–77 (describing the Court’s formulation of causation and 
intent under Title VII). 
 137. While sole or only cause is available, it is not generally used in either tort law 
or employment discrimination law.  For a recent case discussing the erroneous use of 
“sole cause” in the circuit’s Title VII case law, see Ponce v. Billington, 679 F.3d 840, 846 
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (banishing “the word ‘sole’ from [the circuit’s] Title VII lexicon”). 
 138. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 281 (1989) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (explaining that the plurality’s two-part analysis incorporates but-for 
causation).  But see id. at 240 (plurality opinion) (refusing to construe “because of” as 
colloquial shorthand for but for causation). 
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rebuttal by the defendant’s same-decision defense.139  As Justice 
O’Connor noted, there were a few types of torts cases in which such a 
variation on but-for causation was used.  Thus, one could have been 
optimistic at the time of Price Waterhouse and Congress’s adjustment of 
the Price Waterhouse mixed-motives analysis that the Court and 
Congress would appreciate the differences between tort law and 
employment discrimination law and adjust the tort causation 
standards appropriately over time as employment discrimination 
cases arose that demonstrated the need. 
The evolution of tort cause-in-fact standards reached its nadir in 
2009.  The promise of Price Waterhouse, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
and innovative circuit court opinions, such as Rachid v. Jack in the Box, 
Inc.,140 seemed to signal that Congress and the Courts would adjust 
tort cause-in-fact to accommodate the objectives of employment 
discrimination law, but instead the Supreme Court went in a different 
direction in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.141  In a surprising 
opinion, the Court addressed an issue on which it had not granted 
certiorari, holding that the mixed-motives analysis, with its shifting 
burden of persuasion, does not apply to the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act.  The majority opinion in the 5-4 decision insists 
that the statutory language “because of” does mean but for 
causation,142 and expresses distaste for the burden-shifting mixed-
motives framework.143  The Gross decision, thus, retreats from the 
innovative mixed-motives variation on but for causation and arguably 
entrenches the but for standard in all employment discrimination 
statutes that use only the “because of” language;144 this includes all 
                                                            
 139. See id. at 258 (plurality opinion) (holding that after the plaintiff proves that 
an impermissible trait, such as race, gender, or national origin, was a motivating 
factor in the employment decision, the defendant may avoid liability only by invoking 
the same-decision defense).  Justice O’Connor provided two examples of common 
law tort cases where a variation on but-for causation shifts the burden to the 
defendants to prove that their action was not the but for cause of the plaintiff’s 
injury:  (1) “multiple causation cases, where a breach of duty has been established,” 
and (2) cases “where the effect of a defendant’s tortious conduct combines with a 
force of unknown or innocent origin to produce the harm to the plaintiff.”  Id. at 
263–64 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 140. 376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2004).  Rachid is discussed infra Part II.C.3. 
 141. See 557 U.S. 167 (2009). 
 142. Id. at 176–77. 
 143. See id. at 179 (stating that it is apparent that Price Waterhouse’s burden-shifting 
framework is difficult to apply).  For example, in jury trials it has been particularly 
difficult for judges to explain Price Waterhouse’s burden-shifting framework through 
jury instructions.  Id. 
 144. Because the Court was interpreting “because of” statutory language, the 
decision might render the mixed-motives framework inapplicable to all 
discrimination statutes except Title VII, which also has the statutory “motivating 
factor” language.  See Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 961–62 
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statutes except Title VII, to which the Civil Rights Act of 1991 added 
“motivating factor.”145   
The dissenting opinions in Gross disagreed with the majority’s 
equation of but for with “because of” and its departure from both 
Price Waterhouse and perceived congressional intent in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991.146  One dissenting opinion, written by Justice Breyer, 
focused on the differences between tort law and employment 
discrimination law, which justify application of different principles.  
Justice Breyer’s dissent expressed that view as follows:   
It is one thing to require a typical tort plaintiff to show “but-for” 
causation.  In that context, reasonably objective scientific or 
commonsense theories of physical causation make the concept of 
“but-for” causation comparatively easy to understand and relatively 
easy to apply.  But it is an entirely different matter to determine a 
“but-for” relation when we consider, not physical forces, but the 
mind-related characterizations that constitute motive.147 
Gross remains the law despite protestations from a variety of 
different interests.148  There was even an attempt in Congress to 
                                                            
(7th Cir. 2010) (finding that the Gross holding renders mixed motives inapplicable to 
Americans with Disabilities Act).  But see Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320, 329 (5th 
Cir. 2010) (refusing to extend the holding of Gross to the antiretaliation provision in 
Title VII because the Gross court specifically refused to incorporate Title VII 
decisions in its analysis).  The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case in 
which it may resolve the scope of the Gross holding.  See Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. 
Med. Ctr., 674 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 2013 WL 203552 (Jan. 18, 2013). 
 145. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). 
 146. Gross, 557 U.S. at 180 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 147. Id. at 190 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 148. Not surprisingly, the AARP did not like the decision.  See David G. Savage, 
Supreme Court Makes Age-Bias Suits Harder To Win, L.A. TIMES (June 19, 2009), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jun/19/nation/na-court-age-bias19 (discussing 
how the Supreme Court’s conservative decision will make it harder for older workers 
to bring successful age-discrimination claims because it eliminated the long-standing 
two-step approach and replaced it with the requirement that plaintiffs “bear the full 
burden of proving that age was the deciding factor in the dismissal or demotion”).  
AARP attorney Thomas W. Osborne was critical of the decision, characterizing it as 
one of several Court decisions suggesting that age discrimination is different from 
other types and not as serious.  See Susan J. McGolrick, Justices 5–4 Adopt But-For 
Causation, Reject Burden Shifting for ADEA Claims, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 116, at 
AA-1 (June 19, 2009) (noting that Osborne was “absolutely” surprised by “how far the 
court went” in the Gross decision).  Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Senator 
Patrick Leahy stated as follows:  “By disregarding congressional intent and the time-
honored understanding of the statute, a five member majority of the Court has today 
stripped our most senior American employees of important protections.”  Id. at AA-3.  
Senator Leahy further likened the Gross decision to the Court’s “wrong-headed” 
ruling in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), which Congress 
overturned in the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009.  Id.  For other criticism, see 
Kevin P. McGowan, EEOC Provides Guidance on Waivers, Hears Testimony on Age Bias 
Developments, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 134, at A-14 (July 16, 2009) (noting that 
outside witnesses criticized the Supreme Court holding in Gross at a July 15 EEOC 
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overrule the decision by introducing legislation, the Protecting Older 
Workers Against Discrimination Act.149  This frustration is not 
unwarranted.  Gross is among the most disappointing and alarming of 
the Supreme Court’s decisions tortifying employment discrimination 
law.  Having demonstrated its facility with adapting torts standards to 
the objectives of employment discrimination law, the Court did not 
do that in Gross.  Rather, the Gross Court limited innovations and 
reverted to the most basic causation standard, which is also the most 
onerous for plaintiffs to satisfy.150  This is not a propitious trajectory 
for the management of transplanted tort doctrine. 
A further incorporation of tort law into employment 
discrimination law, although less express, is the Supreme Court’s 
recognition of hostile environment sexual harassment as a covered 
type of employment discrimination in Meritor Savings Bank v. 
Vinson.151  The harassment theory, particularly hostile environment,152 
is very tort-like,153 focusing on the dignitary harm that results from 
the discrimination.154  The Supreme Court, in developing the 
employer’s affirmative defense to liability for supervisor sexual 
harassment in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,155 invoked the tort 
doctrine of avoidable consequences.156  Harassment theory has 
expanded the types of conduct and resulting injuries for which 
plaintiffs may seek recovery under employment discrimination law, 
and it is an area of employment discrimination that is very tort-like.  
The foregoing are some of the most salient examples of tort law 
being imported into employment discrimination law.  Although there 
are other examples,157 the Court’s recent incorporation of proximate 
                                                            
meeting); Editorial, Age Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2009, at A22 (calling for 
Congress to reverse Gross as it did Ledbetter). 
 149. See supra note 27. 
 150. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 151. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 152. Although the Court stated that the terms “quid pro quo” and “hostile 
environment” are of “limited utility,” it acknowledged that they remain relevant in 
distinguishing types of conduct.  Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 743 
(1998).  In fact, courts still use the terms frequently. 
 153. Professor Chamallas has described the migration of law regarding sexual 
harassment as moving from employment discrimination to tort.  See Chamallas, supra 
note 31, at 2180–87 (discussing how the law of sexual harassment has influenced 
development of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
 154. See Bernstein, supra note 38, at 451 (discussing the “tort-like wrong of sexual 
harassment”). 
 155. 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 156. Id. at 764 (stating that “Title VII borrows from tort law the avoidable 
consequences doctrine”). 
 157. See, e.g., Frank, supra note 10, at 520 (recognizing that included in these tort 
principles are the doctrines of “avoidable consequences . . . , respondeat superior 
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cause theory to determine subordinate bias liability is the latest 
example, and it ushers into employment discrimination law a tort 
principle that has been more troublesome in torts than cause-in-fact. 
II. MCDONNELL DOUGLAS FRAMEWORK:  A PRETEXT FOR RES IPSA 
LOQUITUR 
Although the tortification of employment discrimination law has 
attracted attention and commentary, few have implicated the pretext 
analysis developed in McDonnell Douglas. Some courts and 
commentators have remarked that pretext analysis is an 
incorporation of the tort doctrine of res ipsa loquitur into 
antidiscrimination law.158  This Part explores the relationship between 
the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis and res ipsa.  It also contends 
that the most significant analysis in employment discrimination law 
should not be modeled on a tort analysis used for unusual cases in 
which the breach in a negligence claim is a mystery.  It begins by 
examining the tort doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and ends by 
recommending that res ipsa, as manifested in the McDonnell Douglas 
pretext analysis, should be extirpated from employment 
discrimination law. 
A. Res Ipsa Loquitur:  Latin for “The Thing Speaks for Itself” 
The tort “doctrine”159 of res ipsa loquitur seems to be an exotic 
mantra imbued with mystical powers.  In fact, it is not so mysterious.  
It is well explained as a rule regarding the use of circumstantial 
evidence in a negligence case.  The Restatement (Third) of Torts 
describes res ipsa in this way: 
[R]es ipsa loquitur is circumstantial evidence of a quite distinctive 
form.  The doctrine implies that the court does not know, and 
cannot find out, what actually happened in the individual case.  
Instead, the finding of likely negligence is derived from knowledge 
of the causes of the type or category of accidents involved.160 
Differently stated, res ipsa permits the fact finder to infer or 
presume a breach by the defendant(s) when the plaintiff has 
                                                            
liability, the discovery rule, shifting burdens of proof, the fellow servant rule, 
principles of causation, the eggshell skull rule, and others”). 
 158. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 159. Res ipsa has been variously characterized “as a rule, principle, doctrine, 
maxim, and [by] one particularly frustrated scholar, a myth.”  G. Gregg Webb, Note, 
The Law of Falling Objects:  Byrne v. Boadle and the Birth of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 59 STAN. L. 
REV. 1065, 1065 (2007). 
 160. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 17 
cmt. a (2010). 
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difficulty producing evidence of a specific act or acts by the 
defendant(s) that constitute a breach of the standard of care.161   
The incantation and invocation of res ipsa is seductive.  From many 
years of grading the Torts exams of first-year law students, I know that 
they are eager to find res ipsa in every exam, if not every fact pattern 
on an exam.162  Plaintiffs also seem to be eager to include res ipsa in 
their pleadings and requested jury instructions because res ipsa 
enables a plaintiff who successfully invokes it to take a case to the fact 
finder without proving the precise breach committed by the 
defendant.163  Rather, the jury is instructed that it may find some 
undefined breach by the defendant based on the circumstantial 
evidence.164  Plaintiffs likely also enjoy a second less obvious 
advantage:  under res ipsa, the cause-in-fact inquiry becomes 
muddled, and defendants often have no clear target in arguing 
absence of cause-in-fact.165  The but-for causation test inquires 
whether the damage would have occurred if the breach had not 
occurred.  If the breach is presumed but not clearly defined, it is 
more difficult to answer the counterfactual inquiry posed by cause-
in-fact analysis.  Thus, if the fact finder is willing to infer that an 
unknown breach occurred, it may be willing to presume cause-in-
fact as well. 
1. Historical Origins of Res Ipsa Loquitor 
For a doctrine shrouded in mystery, there is nothing mysterious 
about the source that gave it impetus, although that case was not its 
origin.166  The phrase is traced to the pronouncement of Chief Baron 
                                                            
 161. See id. § 17 cmt. j (noting that most jurisdictions allow res ipsa to create a 
permissive inference of breach). 
 162. Perhaps it is the allure of Latin.  See Clifford A. Hull et al., Understanding Latin 
Legalese, available at http://www.dummies.com/how-to/content/understanding-latin-
legalese.html (proposing that lawyers’ fondness of Latin phrases stems from the 
strong influence that ancient Rome’s legal system had on Western countries). 
 163. See, e.g., Kerri Lynn Stone, Shortcuts in Employment Discrimination Law, 56 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 111, 146 (2011) (explaining that res ipsa loquitur is “a powerful force 
that militates against holding a plaintiff’s lack of access to crucial evidence against 
him where the totality of the circumstances indicates that there is not a sound reason 
to do so”). 
 164. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 17 cmt. a (explaining how the jury can reason from general to specific to infer if 
there was a breach). 
 165. See, e.g., Erik S. Knutsen, Ambiguous Cause-in-Fact and Structured Causation:  A 
Multi-Jurisdictional Approach, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 249, 277–78 (2003) (exploring the 
relationship between res ipsa and ambiguous cause-in-fact cases). 
 166. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. a (1965) (attributing the 
origin to Baron Pollock in Byrne v. Boadle); Webb, supra note 159, at 1067 (“Rarely 
has the first use of a well-known legal phrase been so clearly traceable to an 
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Jonathan Frederick Pollock in the 1863 British case Byrne v. Boadle.167  
The case involved a barrel falling out of a shop on a London street, 
hitting a passerby, and permanently injuring him.168  The attorney for 
the business argued that the plaintiff had not proven a breach by the 
defendant or its employees.169  Chief Baron Pollack launched the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur on its dubious career when he 
responded, “There are certain cases of which it may be said res ipsa 
loquitur, and this seems one of them.”170  The doctrine would be 
more fully developed in two subsequent cases.171  The dissent of Chief 
Justice Erle in Scott v. London & St. Katherine Docks Co.172 suggested the 
addition of the predicate facts that the injury-causing thing is shown 
to be under the control of the defendant or its servants and such 
accidents ordinarily do not happen if those in control of the thing 
use proper care.173  Next in Briggs v. Oliver,174 the phrase res ipsa 
loquitur was combined with the predicate facts from Erle’s dissent.175  
One commentator’s chronology of the development of the doctrine 
traces it back to an earlier principle in English law of presumptive 
negligence when passengers of common carriers were injured and 
suffered from a deficit of evidence to establish a breach by the 
common carrier.176  The adaptation of this principle of presumptive 
negligence in the broader range of cases to which res ipsa was 
applied was a positive development for plaintiffs, who were aided by 
the doctrine.177 
In American tort law, the Restatement (Second) of Torts set forth 
the “principle” of res ipsa loquitur, stating that negligence may be 
inferred as the cause of a plaintiff’s damage when the following 
predicate facts are established:  the event is of a kind that ordinarily 
does not happen in the absence of negligence; other causes, such as 
conduct of the plaintiff and third parties, is sufficiently eliminated; 
                                                            
individual case.”).  But see Webb, supra note 159, at 1077 (tracing the term to a 1614 
British case). 
 167. (1863) 159 Eng. Rep. 299, 300 (Exch.). 
 168. Id. at 299. 
 169. Id. at 299–300. 
 170. Id. at 300. 
 171. See Webb, supra note 159, at 1107–08 (following the evolution of the 
doctrine). 
 172. (1865) 3 H. & C. 596, 601 (Exch.). 
 173. Id. at 667. 
 174. (1866) 4 H. & C. 403 (Exch.). 
 175. See Webb, supra note 159, at 1108 (describing the incorporation of res ipsa 
with Erle’s dissent in Briggs as the final step in res ipsa’s beginnings). 
 176. Id. at 1084–88. 
 177. Id. at 1107 (stating that “[r]es ipsa loquitur, as it was applied in Byrne and 
its progeny, blurred the edges of negligence in favor of injured plaintiffs, not 
defendant businesses”). 
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and the negligence is within the scope of the defendant’s duty.178  
Other courts and authorities have included another element:  that 
evidence of the cause of the injury is more accessible to the 
defendant than the plaintiff.179  While accessibility was not a part of 
the Restatement (Second)’s prerequisites, the comment to section 
328D recaptured the last element, stating that a plaintiff may 
eliminate other responsible causes by showing that the cause of the 
event was within the defendant’s responsibility or that the defendant 
was responsible for all reasonably probable causes.180 
2. Three problems with res ipsa (that it shares with McDonnell Douglas) 
a. The amorphous prerequisite facts of res ipsa 
The establishment of certain prerequisite facts continues to be a 
central feature of res ipsa law, which justifies application of the 
doctrine and its advantages for plaintiffs.  The prerequisite facts also 
provide some assurance that the defendant most likely breached the 
standard of reasonable care in some undefined or ill-defined way 
notwithstanding the plaintiff’s inability to prove the particular 
breach.181  The Restatement (Third) explains the reticence about this 
doctrine: “[R]es ipsa loquitur does produce an element of 
discomfort, inasmuch as the defendant can be found negligent 
without any evidence as to the nature or circumstances of the 
defendant’s actual conduct.  This discomfort leads to some 
circumspection in the application of res ipsa loquitur.”182  
Notwithstanding this uneasiness, the Restatement (Third) pares 
down the requirements for application of res ipsa to a more basic 
requirement:  “the accident causing the plaintiff’s harm is a type of 
accident that ordinarily happens as a result of the negligence of a 
class of actors of which the defendant is the relevant member.”183   
The role of the prerequisite facts for invoking res ipsa is to justify 
finding a breach and perhaps holding a defendant liable despite the 
plaintiff’s inability to prove a specific breach.  Yet the role of 
                                                            
 178. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965). 
 179. See William L. Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 MINN. L. 
REV. 241, 260 (1936).  It has been argued that the accessibility-to-evidence element is 
used when courts want to expand res ipsa.  Id. (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 9, at 244 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 180. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. g. 
 181. See Okediji, supra note 25, at 84 (acknowledging that prerequisites give 
assurance that negligence likely occurred). 
 182. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 17 
cmt. a (2010). 
 183. Id. § 17. 
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prerequisite facts in invoking res ipsa is one of the issues that has 
generated the most disagreement among courts and authorities.  The 
early English case law and the Restatement (Second) articulated the 
requirement of three prerequisites.184  The Restatement (Third) 
adopted a pared-down test for the applicability of res ipsa.185  The two 
other versions that were rejected by the latest Restatement consist of 
two steps.186  The first applies res ipsa if the accident is of a type that 
usually occurs because of negligence and the instrumentality causing 
the harm was under the exclusive control of the defendant.187  The 
other two-step formulation requires that the type of accident usually 
happens because of negligence, and such negligence is usually that of 
the defendant rather than some other party.188   
Thus, one of the most unsettled and vexing features of res ipsa 
loquitur is the disagreement and uncertainty regarding the predicate 
facts which determine whether res ipsa loquitur applies to a given 
case.  This is a major problem because the predicate facts justify 
giving a plaintiff the advantages of res ipsa.  If there is confusion, 
disagreement, or loss of confidence in these foundational facts, then 
res ipsa is likely to be seen as creating an unjustified inference or 
presumption that eases the usual burden and requirements imposed 
on plaintiffs in typical litigation.189  The disagreement and confusion 
over the prerequisites or foundational facts and a resulting loss of 
confidence in the presumption raised by the analysis are 
characteristics that the McDonnell Douglas pretext framework shares 
with res ipsa, as will be developed later.190 
b. Uncertainty regarding the procedural effect of res ipsa 
Another troublesome feature of res ipsa that also is suffered by 
McDonnell Douglas is, if it is applicable to a claim, its procedural effects 
are unclear.  Some jurisdictions interpret res ipsa as creating a 
permissible inference of breach, while others have held that it has the 
more significant procedural effect of creating a rebuttable 
                                                            
 184. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965) (listing three 
prerequisites). 
 185. See supra text accompanying note 183.  The Restatement (Third) rejected two 
other versions, although these versions are accepted by some courts. 
 186. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 17 
cmt. b. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See supra notes 162–65 and accompanying text. 
 190. See infra Part II.C.2(a)(i). 
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presumption of breach.191  A majority of courts have adopted the view 
that res ipsa gives rise to a permissible inference of breach.192  Even in 
those jurisdictions, however, the evidence may be such in exceptional 
cases that no reasonable fact finder could find that the defendant did 
not breach.193  A minority of jurisdictions, by case law or statute, 
accord the greater effect of rebuttable presumption.194  Still other 
jurisdictions seem to use “permissible inference” and “rebuttable 
presumption” interchangeably, not carefully distinguishing the 
difference in procedural effect.195  The New York Court of Appeals 
acknowledged the tendency of courts to use the terms 
interchangeably and explained that courts in that state “have grown 
more sensitive to the differences between inferences and 
presumptions, recognizing that terminology can carry varying 
procedural implications.”196   
A third vexing aspect of res ipsa that it shares with McDonnell 
Douglas is the uncertainty regarding the types of cases to which it is 
applicable.  Because res ipsa is considered a rule or principle 
regarding circumstantial evidence, some authorities and courts reject 
the applicability of res ipsa in cases in which direct evidence of 
breach is presented or available.197  This distinction, however, is based 
on the much-maligned and ill-defined distinction between 
circumstantial and direct evidence.198 
                                                            
 191. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 17 cmt. j (distinguishing the jurisdictional split in the effect of res ipsa). 
 192. Id. § 17 cmt. j. 
 193. See id. (identifying the minority approach); see also Ryan v. Fast Lane, Inc., 360 
S.W.3d 787, 790 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012) (exemplifying the minority approach to res 
ipsa). 
 194. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. 29-6-115(c) (2012); Kendrick v. Pippin, 252 P.3d 
1052 (Colo. 2011) (employing the rebuttable presumption standard). 
 195. See, e.g., Morejon v. Rais Const. Co., 851 N.E.2d 1143, 1146–48 (N.Y. 2006) 
(highlighting the various standards of res ipsa used by courts and the tendency to 
conflate the standards). 
 196. Id. at 1147; see also Alan W. Stewart, Note, Are We Allowing the Thing to Speak for 
Itself?  Linnear v. CenterPoint Energy and Res Ipsa Loquitur in Louisiana, 71 LA. L. REV. 
1091, 1099 (2011) (explaining that the uncertainty regarding presumption or 
inference was “most likely due to a careless interchanging of the two words by judges”). 
 197. See Linnear v. CenterPoint Energy Entex/Reliant Energy, 966 So. 2d 36, 41–
42 (La. 2007) (reversing the appellate court after it applied res ipsa despite the fact 
that direct evidence was presented); B & K Rentals & Sales Co. v. Universal Leaf 
Tobacco Co., 596 A.2d 640, 647 (Md. 1991) (affirming the trial and appellate courts’ 
decisions not to submit the theory of res ipsa to the jury); Stahlecker v. Ford Motor 
Co., 667 N.W.2d 244, 252 (Neb. 2003) (finding the doctrine of res ipsa inapplicable 
to the case at hand). 
 198. This is true both as a principle of evidence generally, and as applied to 
employment discrimination law specifically.  Regarding the general principle, 
consider the following observations: 
The problem with the direct-circumstantial distinction is not simply that 
common beliefs about the significance of the distinction are false. A more 
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The foregoing three problems, uncertainties, or controversies 
regarding res ipsa loquitur lead to an overarching characteristic of res 
ipsa loquitur that it shares with its sibling McDonnell Douglas—given its 
nebulous nature, reticence of courts to ease the usual litigation 
burdens of plaintiffs without justification, and the skepticism about 
the inference or presumption to be drawn based on surrogate 
questions (substitutes for whether the defendant committed a breach 
of the standard of care)—the doctrine is more trouble than it is 
worth.  Consequently, authorities sometimes attempt to limit the 
applicability and influence of res ipsa, but it has a dogged tenacity 
and perseverance, as indicated by its pervasive acceptance and its 
survival in the Restatement (Third).  Its unwillingness to succumb, 
notwithstanding its many failings, is another thing it shares with 
McDonnell Douglas. 
Linnear v. Centerpoint Energy Entex/Reliant Energy199 demonstrates 
some of the predominant problems with res ipsa.  The Louisiana 
Supreme Court had defined and refined res ipsa in several decisions 
before Linnear.200  The principles announced in Linnear marked a 
significant limitation on the use of res ipsa.201  The plaintiffs, wife and 
husband, sued for injury of the wife, who fell on her property and 
injured her leg.202  They sued a company that recently had replaced a 
gas line on their property.203  She sued for negligence in filling the 
                                                            
fundamental problem is that the distinction, while perhaps appealing on the 
level of intuition, makes no logical sense. There simply is no category of 
evidence that brings us into direct contact with crucial facts because no such 
contact is possible. All facts are a function of interpretation, and this 
unavoidability of interpretation makes all facts a matter of inference and all 
evidence, whether called “direct” or “circumstantial,” nothing more or less 
than a contribution to that inferential process. 
Richard K. Greenstein, Determining Facts:  The Myth of Direct Evidence, 45 HOUS. L. 
REV. 1801, 1804 (2009); see also Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading Employment 
Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 1658 n.220 (2011) [hereinafter 
Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading] (citing 1A JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW § 24, at 945 n.5 (Peter Tillers ed., 1983) (concluding there is no 
clear distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence)).  Regarding the 
distinction in the employment discrimination context, the Court in Desert Palace, 
Inc. v. Costa made the unimportance of distinguishing between direct and 
circumstantial evidence a linchpin of its decision.  539 U.S. 90, 99–100 (2003). 
 199. 966 So. 2d 36 (La. 2007). 
 200. Stewart, supra note 196, at 1095 (stating that since its recognition in a case in 
1899, “Louisiana courts have continuously developed the doctrine, but . . . they 
experienced significant confusion about the requirements for the doctrine’s 
applicability and its effects”). 
 201. See Linnear, 966 So. 2d at 43 (noting the lower court’s misapplication of 
res ipsa). 
 202. Id. at 38. 
 203. Id. 
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trench and sodding the area after replacing the gas line.204  The 
company produced the testimony of two employees who worked on 
the project, who described in detail how the filling and re-sodding 
was done.205  The plaintiffs introduced the testimony of the wife 
regarding the fall and photographs of the area where the woman 
fell.206  The trial court rejected the plaintiff’s request for a res ipsa 
jury instruction, and the jury returned a verdict for the defendant.207  
The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court committed 
reversible error by not giving a res ipsa instruction and, conducting a 
de novo review, held that the defendant was negligent.208   
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, explaining that it had 
long held that res ipsa should be applied sparingly209 and imposing 
two significant limitations on the applicability of the doctrine.210  
First, the court held that it “only applies where direct evidence of 
defendant’s negligence is not available to assist the plaintiff to 
present a prima facie case of negligence.”211  The court explained 
that in the case before it direct evidence was not only available, but 
presented and considered.212  Second, the court stated the three 
predicate criteria213 and held that a judge may give a res ipsa 
instruction only if the judge concludes that reasonable minds could 
differ on all three of those facts.214  Considering these two holdings, 
a commentator concluded that the Louisiana court had narrowed 
the applicability of res ipsa.215  Moreover, given that all a plaintiff 
obtains procedurally from a res ipsa instruction in Louisiana is a 
permissible inference of breach, that commentator concluded that 
plaintiffs would be better off without res ipsa, as obvious breaches 
would speak for themselves without Latin.216  
                                                            
 204. Id. at 38–39. 
 205. Id. at 39. 
 206. Id. at 39–40. 
 207. Id. at 40. 
 208. Id. at 40–41. 
 209. Id. at 44. 
 210. See infra notes 211–14 and accompanying text (describing the limited 
situations in which res ipsa is appropriate). 
 211. Linnear, 966 So. 2d at 42. 
 212. Id.  One troubling aspect of this holding is that it does not specify which party 
or parties must have access to direct evidence.  The court characterized the evidence 
as “competing direct evidence,” id., but that does not seem correct.  Only the 
defendant had evidence that might be described as direct. 
 213. Although the Louisiana courts have varied in their statements, the court in 
Linnear listed them as follows:  (1) injury is of type that ordinarily does not occur 
without negligence; (2) evidence sufficiently eliminates other more probable causes; 
and (3) alleged negligence is within scope of defendant’s duty to plaintiff.  Id. at 44. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Stewart, supra note 196, at 1106–09. 
 216. Id. at 1110. 
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B. McDonnell Douglas Pretext Analysis:  Preventing Discrimination from 
Speaking for Itself 
The McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis is a barely modified version 
of res ipsa loquitur, and it suffers from some of the same problems.  
The three-stage framework with shifting burdens of production is 
well-worn and well-known.217  The first stage of the framework is for 
the plaintiff to satisfy the burden of production on four predicate 
criteria:  (1) plaintiff is protected by the applicable employment 
discrimination statute; (2) she applied for a job for which she was 
qualified; (3) she was not hired; and (4) the position remained open 
and the employer continued to seek applicants with qualifications 
like those of plaintiff.218  The Supreme Court also explained in the 
McDonnell Douglas opinion itself,219 and then later in McDonald v. 
Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.,220 that the elements of the prima 
facie case may vary depending upon the facts; that qualification will 
be addressed more fully later.221  If the plaintiff satisfies the burden of 
production on the prima facie case, and plaintiffs usually do because 
so little is required,222 the plaintiff enjoys a rebuttable presumption of 
discrimination, and the burden of production shifts to the defendant 
employer to produce sufficient evidence of a “legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse employment action.223  If 
the employer satisfies its burden of production at stage two, and 
employers almost always do,224 the burden or production shifts back 
                                                            
 217. In McDonnell Douglas, an African American former employee sued his 
employer for discriminatory employment practices when the employer laid him off 
and would not subsequently re-hire him because of his participation in the Civil 
Rights Movement.  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 794 (1973).  To 
evaluate the complainant’s claim, the Supreme Court articulated a test that first gives 
the plaintiff the burden of showing a prima facie case of racial discrimination, and 
then shifts the burden to the employer to provide “some legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason” for rejecting the employee.  Id. at 802.  Once this is done, 
the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuasion in proving the employer’s 
alleged reason for the adverse employment decision is pretextual and its actual 
reason is discriminatory.  Id. at 804. 
 218. Id. at 802. 
 219. Id. at 802 n.13. 
 220. 427 U.S. 273, 279 n.6 (1976). 
 221. For further discussion, see infra notes 235–40 and accompanying text. 
 222. Plaintiffs easily satisfy the burden of production.  See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, 
Disparate Impact:  Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 
927 (2005) [hereinafter Sullivan, Disparate Impact] (observing that “the first step of 
McDonnell Douglas, the prima facie case, has always required little proof”). 
 223. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). 
 224. Defendants rarely have trouble satisfying the burden at this stage, either.  
Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas:  A Simplified Method 
for Assessing Evidence in Discrimination Cases, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 659, 665 (1998); see also 
Sullivan, Disparate Impact, supra note 222, at 928 (“The requirements the defendant 
must meet are thus minimal:  first, the nondiscriminatory reason must be put into 
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to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s reason is pretextual.225  
The burden of persuasion on the ultimate issue of discrimination 
remains with the plaintiff.226  If the plaintiff proves pretext, then the 
fact finder may find, but is not required to find, that the employer 
discriminated.227   
Although some have recognized the pretext analysis as a barely 
modified version of res ipsa loquitur and the McDonnell Douglas 
framework have a lot in common, the Supreme Court has never 
identified it as such.  So let us unveil McDonnell Douglas as a mere 
pretext for res ipsa.  First, both are treatments, rules, or doctrines 
regarding use of circumstantial evidence, ascribing procedural 
consequences to the production of circumstantial evidence regarding 
certain issues.  As noted above, res ipsa loquitur often has been called 
a rule or doctrine regarding circumstantial evidence.228  The 
Supreme Court made clear early on that the McDonnell Douglas 
pretext framework was designed to analyze cases involving 
circumstantial evidence of employment discrimination.229   
A second similarity is the significance and function of the predicate 
facts.  In order for res ipsa to apply to a case, certain prerequisites or 
predicate facts must be established.230  This is true, too, of the pretext 
analysis.  In Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,231 the Supreme Court 
explained the reason that the predicate facts in the analysis justified a 
presumption of discrimination: 
A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of 
discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise 
unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration 
of impermissible factors.  And we are willing to presume this largely 
because we know from our experience that more often than not 
                                                            
evidence and not just argued and second, the nondiscriminatory reason must not be 
too vague, as some courts have rejected nondiscriminatory reasons for vagueness.”). 
 225. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. 
 226. See, e.g., St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 518 (1993) (citing 
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256). 
 227. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); Hicks, 509 
U.S. at 509–10. 
 228. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 17 cmt. a (2010). 
 229. The Court explained the rationale for according the circumstantial evidence 
procedural significance in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 
(1978).  In dissenting opinions, the Court has recognized that the pretext analysis 
manipulates circumstantial evidence.  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 584 
(2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Hicks, 509 U.S. at 536 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 230. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the role of the predicate facts). 
 231. 438 U.S. 567 (1978). 
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people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any 
underlying reasons, especially in a business setting.  Thus, when all 
legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated 
as possible reasons for the employer’s actions, it is more likely than 
not the employer, who we generally assume acts only with some 
reason, based his decision on an impermissible consideration such 
as race.232  
Despite the similarities between res ipsa and the McDonnell Douglas 
analysis regarding predicate facts, there is one respect in which the 
analyses differ.  In the tort doctrine, the plaintiff bears the burden of 
establishing all of the prerequisites for the applicability of res ipsa, 
whereas in the pretext analysis, the burden of production shifts 
between the plaintiff and the defendant.  The divided burden in the 
pretext analysis means that the defendant must first provide a reason 
for the adverse employment action before the plaintiff can attack that 
reason as pretextual.233 
A third similarity between res ipsa and pretext is the variability of 
the predicates that must be established for application.234  The 
Supreme Court explained that the elements of the McDonnell Douglas 
prima facie case vary depending on the facts.235  In most cases, the 
variation in elements occurs because the adverse employment action 
differs from the refusal to rehire at issue in McDonnell Douglas.236  As 
Professor Sullivan has observed, “the famous four prongs of the 
prima facie case were tailored to the relatively unusual facts before 
the Court, namely an employer’s refusal to rehire a qualified black 
former employee when the job in question remained vacant.”237  For 
example, the elements are varied where the complained-of adverse 
employment action is a reduction in force.238  Moreover, some courts 
vary the basic McDonnell Douglas prima facie case when the claim is 
one of so-called “reverse discrimination,” in which the plaintiff is not 
a member of a class that historically has not suffered much 
                                                            
 232. Id. at 577 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 
 233. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973) (requiring 
the lower court to give the respondent an opportunity to show that petitioner’s 
stated reason for the adverse employment action was pretextual). 
 234. The different elements that have been required for res ipsa are detailed above.  
See supra Part II.A.2 (laying out the requirements for a plaintiff’s res ipsa claim). 
 235. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13. 
 236. See id. at 796 (alleging that, after the employee was laid-off, the employer 
failed to re-hire plaintiff for race reasons). 
 237. Sullivan, Disparate Impact, supra note 222, at 926. 
 238. See Developments in the Law—Shifting Burdens of Proof in Employment 
Discrimination Litigation, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1579, 1587–88 (1996) (discussing variation 
on the prima facie case when the plaintiff cannot be immediately compared to 
another employee). 
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discrimination, such as Caucasians or men.239  Some courts have 
varied the prima facie case in reverse discrimination cases, imposing 
an additional requirement on a plaintiff to produce evidence of 
“background circumstances” suggesting that the employer is an 
unusual employer that would be likely to discriminate against a 
member of a class that historically has not suffered substantial 
employment discrimination.240  
A fourth similarity, and one that is particularly important to this 
topic, is the procedural effect accorded the circumstantial evidence 
under res ipsa and McDonnell Douglas.241  As discussed above, some 
jurisdictions at various times have accorded res ipsa the effect of a 
rebuttable presumption that a breach occurred, but most give it the 
effect of a permissible inference.242  The procedural effect of a 
plaintiff satisfying her burdens of production in the pretext analysis 
has been the subject of several Supreme Court decisions, culminating 
with Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.243  It is now well 
established that if a plaintiff satisfies the burdens of production on 
the prima facie case and pretext, the fact finder may, but is not 
required, to infer that the defendant employer illegally 
discriminated.244 
A final similarity between res ipsa and the pretext analysis is the 
uncertainty regarding the type of cases to which they apply.  For res 
ipsa, a couple of questions arise:  (1) Does it apply to cases in which a 
plaintiff attempts to prove a specific breach, but also pleads res ipsa 
                                                            
 239. See Charles A. Sullivan, Circling Back to the Obvious:  The Convergence of 
Traditional and Reverse Discrimination in Title VII Proof, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1031, 
1035–36 (2004) [hereinafter Sullivan, Circling] (explaining the differences between 
“traditional” discrimination and reverse discrimination). 
 240. See, e.g., Duffy v. Wolle, 123 F.3d 1026, 1036 (8th Cir. 1997), abrogated by 
Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011); Parker v. Balt. & Ohio 
R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981).  See generally Sullivan, Circling, supra 
note 239, at 1065–71 (discussing courts’ opinions and logic surrounding background 
circumstances and noting that the term “background circumstances” is 
“amorphous”); Timothy K. Giordano, Comment, Different Treatment for Non-Minority 
Plaintiffs Under Title VII:  A Call for Modification of the Background Circumstances Test To 
Ensure That Separate Is Equal, 49 EMORY L.J. 993, 1001–11 (2000); Donald T. Kramer, 
Annotation, What Constitutes Reverse or Majority Race or National Origin Discrimination 
Violative of Federal Constitution or Statutes—Private Employment Cases, 150 A.L.R. FED. 1, 
27 (1998). 
 241. See Okediji, supra note 25, at 85 (stating that “[t]he procedural effect of res 
ipsa loquitur has been as troublesome in the practice of tort law as the Title VII 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework has been in the practice of employment 
discrimination law”). 
 242. Supra notes 192–96 and accompanying text. 
 243. 530 U.S. 133 (2000). 
 244. Id. at 147–48 (holding that if a plaintiff bears her burden, there is a 
permissible inference at summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law stages); 
St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993). 
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and seeks a res ipsa jury instruction in the alternative?; (2) Does it 
apply to cases in which direct evidence is introduced, and if it is not 
applicable in such cases, does such inapplicability depend on which 
party introduced the direct evidence?  A very difficult and pivotal 
issue imbedded in those questions is how a court should distinguish 
between direct and circumstantial evidence.  As for the pretext 
analysis, Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse 
was the origin of the dividing line that the McDonnell Douglas analysis 
applied to cases involving circumstantial evidence but not to cases 
involving direct evidence, to which the mixed-motives analysis, 
originally developed in Price Waterhouse, applied.245  However, after 
Congress modified and codified the mixed-motives analysis in the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Supreme Court decided in Desert Palace, 
Inc. v. Costa,246 based on the language of the statutory change, that 
the mixed-motives analysis is not restricted to cases in which direct 
evidence of discrimination is produced.247  Now, there is great 
uncertainty and confusion about the types of cases to which the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis applies.248 
In sum, the similarities between res ipsa loquitur and the McDonnell 
Douglas pretext analysis and the problems they share are striking.  
The most significant difference between the McDonnell Douglas proof 
structure and res ipsa is the shifting burdens of production under 
McDonnell Douglas, along with the fact that the plaintiff does enjoy a 
rebuttable presumption of discrimination after establishing a prima 
facie case.  This is an insignificant distinction, however, because 
almost every defendant employer rebuts that presumption by 
producing evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.249  
                                                            
 245. See supra Part I.D. 
 246. 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
 247. Id. at 101–02. 
 248. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title VII 
Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83, 102–03 (2004) (concluding that lower 
courts need guidance from the Supreme Court on how to decide disparate treatment 
cases); Kenneth R. Davis, Price-Fixing:  Refining the Price Waterhouse Standard and 
Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 859, 861 (2004) (noting that 
not only is there disagreement about what constitutes direct evidence, but also that 
when the Court attempted to resolve this issue in Desert Palace, it failed to even 
mention McDonnell Douglas, creating additional confusion); Kaitlin Picco, The Mixed-
Motive Mess:  Defining and Applying a Mixed-Motive Framework, 26 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 
461, 464–65 (2011); Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading, supra note 198, at 1650–51 
(describing the inconsistent ways that McDonnell Douglas is applied, if at all). 
 249. Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 870 (11th Cir. 1985); George 
Rutherglen, Abolition in a Different Voice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1463, 1474 (1992) (book 
review) (“The fact that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case in McDonnell 
Douglas usually is of no consequence because the plaintiff’s burden of making out 
that case, and the defendant’s rebuttal burden of showing a ‘legitimate 
nondiscriminatory’ reason, are so easily satisfied.  Almost all individual cases under 
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Moreover, the shifting burden is merely a burden of production, 
unlike the mixed-motives analysis in which the burden of persuasion 
shifts.250  Although res ipsa does not impose shifting burdens of 
production, in reality defendants do produce evidence to attempt to 
rebut both the prerequisites for application of res ipsa and the 
ultimate issue of a breach by the defendant.  Ultimately, then, both 
res ipsa and McDonnell Douglas give plaintiffs the advantage of a 
permissive inference—permitting, but not compelling, the fact finder 
to infer breach or employment discrimination, respectively.  In 
summary, McDonnell Douglas looks like res ipsa, performs like it, and 
shares its problems. 
If the McDonnell Douglas analysis is essentially res ipsa loquitur, why 
did the Supreme Court not identify it as such?  As discussed earlier, 
the Court has clearly declared in several employment discrimination 
cases, including Staub most recently, that it was borrowing from tort 
law.  A few possible answers occur.  First, perhaps the Court did not 
realize that it was importing res ipsa into employment discrimination 
law.  Second, maybe the Court realized that it was importing res ipsa, 
but it did not think it important to say that it was doing so.  Third, 
McDonnell Douglas was one of the earliest Title VII cases decided by 
the Supreme Court, and the notion that Title VII was merely a 
statutory tort or that tort law could be adopted to do the work of a 
civil rights and public policy statute might have been surprising or 
controversial in 1973.  Regardless of why the Court did not identify 
the pretext analysis as largely unexpurgated tort law, the exposure of 
it as such prompts three questions:  (1) What other options did the 
court have?; (2) Was it appropriate to import res ipsa as the most 
fundamental analysis in employment discrimination law?; and (3) 
Regardless of the propriety at the time of adoption, is it appropriate 
to retain it today?  The questions and answers are related and are 
treated together in the next Section. 
                                                            
McDonnell Douglas come down to a determination whether the plaintiff has proved 
that the ‘legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason’ offered by the defendant is really a 
pretext for discrimination.”). 
 250. See supra Part I.D (discussing the evolution of the mixed-motives analysis and 
the requirements that fall upon each party). 
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C. The Appropriateness of Res Ipsa Loquitur for Employment Discrimination 
Law  
1. In the beginning—forty years ago the Court adopted the pretext 
framework 
Whether the Supreme Court should have adopted, and only 
slightly modified, res ipsa loquitur as the basic analysis for the most 
common type of employment discrimination claim—individual 
disparate treatment—depends in part on the existing alternatives.  
Much of the McDonnell Douglas opinion is hard to understand if one 
does not see it as the Court’s effort to explain why the innovative 
employment discrimination law theory it approved in Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co.—disparate impact—did not apply to the type of claim 
presented in McDonnell Douglas.251  The Court explained that the 
court of appeals had committed error in rejecting the employer’s 
given reason for not rehiring the employee-plaintiff.252  The Court 
further explained that the lower court had relied on Griggs for the 
position that exclusionary employment practices that cannot be 
justified by their relation to job performance violate Title VII.253  The 
Court then declared that Green appeared “in different clothing,” and 
the expansive principles embodied in the disparate impact theory of 
Griggs did not apply to his claim.254  Instead, if Green could not 
disprove as pretextual the employer’s reason for not rehiring him—
that he engaged in an unlawful stall-in—he would lose.255  This 
approach was necessary, the Court explained, to accommodate the 
“societal as well as personal interests on both sides of this 
equation . . . [,] [t]he broad, overriding interest, shared by employer, 
employee, and consumer” in “efficient and trustworthy workmanship 
assured through fair and racially neutral employment and personnel 
decisions.”256 
Thus, without invoking the term, the Court adopted a barely 
modified version of res ipsa loquitur.  The Court later would make 
the res ipsa roots clear when, in Furnco, it explained the justification 
for the pretext analysis:  if the most common reasons for an adverse 
employment action are eliminated through the three stages of the 
                                                            
 251. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805–06 (1973). 
 252. Id. at 805–06 (pointing out that even though the employee’s behavior was not 
directly related to his qualifications for the job, it could still constitute a “legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory” reason for the employer to refrain from re-hiring him). 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at 806. 
 255. Id. at 805. 
 256. Id. at 801. 
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pretext analysis, then discrimination more likely than not is the 
reason for the action.257  So, the Court adopted res ipsa in McDonnell 
Douglas rather than creating new law as it had in Griggs.  According to 
the Court’s rationale in McDonnell Douglas, this res ipsa analysis 
accommodated the competing and shared interests of employers, 
employees, and consumers.258  Furthermore, as the Court explained 
more fully in Furnco, the rationale supporting res ipsa in tort law also 
fit the context of intentional discrimination analysis:  if certain 
predicate facts could be established, then discrimination was a more-
probable-than-not explanation of the adverse employment action at 
issue, just as breach is a likely cause of the damages in a negligence 
case if the res ipsa foundational facts can be established.259  Moreover, 
as Justice O’Connor would explain in her concurring opinion in Price 
Waterhouse sixteen years after the McDonnell Douglas framework was 
unveiled:  “[T]he entire purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie 
case is to compensate for the fact that direct evidence of intentional 
discrimination is hard to come by.”260  Thus, as with res ipsa, the 
pretext framework was a tool bestowed on plaintiffs to help them 
marshal circumstantial evidence to present a case of intentional 
discrimination.261  
Should the Court in McDonnell Douglas have adopted res ipsa as the 
analysis for individual disparate treatment claims?  It is difficult to 
determine now whether the Court in 1973 made a good decision, but 
the balancing of interests and rejection of Griggs articulated in 
McDonnell Douglas, and the post-hoc explanation of the analysis under 
the res ipsa rationale by the Court in Furnco and Justice O’Connor’s 
concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse are well reasoned and 
persuasive.  If the Court believed that employment discrimination was 
common enough that judges were willing to infer discrimination 
from a flimsy prima facie case and a showing of pretext, then res ipsa 
should have functioned well enough in helping plaintiffs present 
cases based on circumstantial evidence.262  Over time, however, the 
                                                            
 257. 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). 
 258. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801. 
 259. See Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577 (asserting that people do not act arbitrarily in 
these business situations). 
 260. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
 261. See id. (finding that this framework would not be appropriate when direct 
evidence is available). 
 262. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) 
(noting that a plaintiff’s presentation of circumstantial evidence can be “quite 
persuasive”). 
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shortcomings of using res ipsa as the basic analysis increasingly began 
to show, and the utter failure now should be apparent. 
2. Forty years of using res ipsa/McDonnell Douglas pretext demonstrates 
the need for change 
Even if the Court’s 1973 adoption of res ipsa in employment 
discrimination law was a good, or at least reasonable, decision at the 
time, the experience with it over forty years yields a dramatically 
different assessment of the decision to cling to it now.  The chinks in 
the armor have been many, and cumulatively they render 
indefensible the maintenance of res ipsa in employment 
discrimination law.  This section addresses two specific developments 
and one overarching theme that render maintenance of the “res ipsa 
McDonnell Douglas” regime untenable now. 
a. Two specific developments in the use of the McDonnell Douglas 
analysis 
i. Enervation of the prima facie case and pretext 
From 1973–2003, the Supreme Court worked with the McDonnell 
Douglas framework, trying to explain its substantive and procedural 
meaning, striving to bolster its weak prima facie case, and attempting 
to retain sufficient flexibility in both the first (prima facie case) and 
third (pretext) stages in order to make the analysis workable in 
various factual scenarios.  The lower courts in turn have worked with 
what the Supreme Court has given them, and the result has been 
confusing; but for a high tolerance of the courts to work through 
uncertainties and vagaries,263 the result could be close to chaotic.264  
The Court early on began working with the analysis, explaining that 
variations in the prima facie case would be necessary and explaining 
the substantive meaning and procedural effects of the second and 
third stages of the analysis.  The fact that the Supreme Court and the 
lower courts have spent so much time tinkering with the proof 
                                                            
 263. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175–76 (2009) (holding 
that the mixed-motives analysis does not apply to age discrimination claims under 
the ADEA and the “because of” statutory language in the ADEA means but-for 
causation); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92 (2003) (holding that direct 
evidence is not required to invoke the “motivating factor” statutory standard inserted 
in Title VII by the Civil Rights Act of 1991). 
 264. In its decision in Desert Palace, the Ninth Circuit used the terms “a quagmire,” 
a “morass,” and “chaos” to describe the state of the law on disparate treatment proof 
structures.  Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 851–53 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’d, 
539 U.S. 90 (2003).  The Ninth Circuit’s assessment predated the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Desert Palace and Gross, which have exacerbated the chaos. 
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structure rather than addressing questions about discrimination—
which are sufficiently numerous, complex, and important in their 
own right—is indicative of the failure of this res ipsa analysis.265  
Ultimately, neither the efforts to adjust and fortify the prima face case 
nor the explication of the pretext stage have proven efficacious in 
maintaining a generally applicable, useful, comprehensible, 
palatable, and flexible analysis. 
First, the Court began working to explain and repair problems in 
the prima facie case soon after it was announced.  The Court in 
McDonnell Douglas itself reserved the possibility that the elements of 
the prima facie case might change depending on the factual 
situation.266  The Court reiterated that idea in the course of holding 
that the framework applied to a reverse discrimination case in Santa 
Fe Trail.267  As courts applied the pretext analysis to subsequent 
reverse discrimination cases, however, the ill fit between res ipsa 
analysis and reverse discrimination cases would become obvious.268 
After Santa Fe Trail, the Court continued to struggle with problems 
raised by the prima facie case.  In Texas Department of Community 
Affairs v. Burdine,269 the Court was confronted with the issue of the 
ease with which virtually any minimally qualified plaintiff could satisfy 
the prima facie case and thus achieve a rebuttable presumption of 
discrimination.270  The Court responded by “slipping in” an 
additional statement about the prima facie case, which Professor 
Malamud labeled a “stealth requirement,” inserted to assuage 
concerns of some justices that the prima facie case was not sufficiently 
demanding.271  The Court’s final opinion noted that the plaintiff’s 
                                                            
 265. See, e.g., Sperino, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 81 (“[T]he use of the 
frameworks often creates questions that might not otherwise arise—because the 
questions are about the frameworks themselves, rather than about the substantive 
discrimination inquiry.”); id. at 105 (“After a framework is created, courts often 
funnel their discrimination inquiries through this typology, rather than through the 
statutory language.  Like the prisoners in the allegory of the cave, courts (and 
litigants) begin to review discrimination based on a shadow of reality.”). 
 266. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973) (“The 
facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification above of the prima 
facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to 
differing factual situations.”). 
 267. See 427 U.S. 273 (1976). 
 268. See supra notes 239–40; infra notes 313–28 and accompanying text 
(discussing the challenges of applying the pretext analysis to the fact patterns that 
deviate from traditional discrimination cases and providing examples of those 
situations). 
 269. 450 U.S. 248 (1981). 
 270. Id. at 253. 
 271. See Malamud, supra note 23, at 2246–54 (shedding light on the Court’s 
decision-making considerations and noting various justices’ concerns with plaintiffs’ 
light burden in the McDonnel Douglas framework). 
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burden is not “onerous,” and added the “stealth requirement” that 
the prima facie case requires the plaintiff to prove “by a 
preponderance of the evidence that she applied for an available 
position for which she was qualified, but was rejected under the 
circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.”272  
Although the stealth requirement has not often been repeated or 
seemed to make a difference in many cases since Burdine,273 it 
demonstrates that the Court recognized the weakness of the 
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case fewer than ten years after it 
announced the proof structure, and it wavered from the res ipsa-
based rationale it articulated in Furnco.  Like res ipsa, the McDonnell 
Douglas framework shares an uncertain and changing prima facie 
case.274   
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue again 
since its 1976 decision in Santa Fe Trail, the inadequacy of the prima 
facie case has been particularly evident and vexatious in reverse 
discrimination cases in the lower courts.275  The McDonnell Douglas 
analysis does not function reasonably in such cases without an 
adjustment, and that adjustment is one which flouts the equal 
treatment foundation of employment discrimination law.  It should 
not be surprising that the unadjusted prima facie case does not 
function well in reverse discrimination cases in view of the Court’s 
explanation in Furnco.  In Furnco, the Court articulated its res ipsa 
rationale for the permissive inference arising from a plaintiff’s 
successful navigation of McDonnell Douglas.  The rationale is based in 
the idea that employment discrimination is fairly common and the 
prima facie case eliminates the two most common nondiscriminatory 
reasons for adverse employment actions.  Thus, if an adverse 
employment action remains unexplained by the employer (because 
the plaintiff has proven the employer’s proffered reason to be 
pretextual), then discrimination is more likely than not the 
explanation.  In reverse discrimination cases, the foregoing 
formulation does not work because reverse discrimination has not 
been commonly practiced historically.276  Accordingly, some courts 
                                                            
 272. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (emphasis added). 
 273. See, e.g., St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) (failing to 
mention the language of the stealth requirement). 
 274. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 275. See infra notes 313–28 and accompanying text (describing the challenging 
fact patterns in Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2011), and 
in Burlington v. News Corp., 759 F. Supp. 2d 580 (E.D. Pa. 2010)). 
 276. See Sperino, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 78–79 (noting that “some courts 
began doubting that the inferences created by McDonnell Douglas made sense in 
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have required that a plaintiff in a reverse discrimination case prove 
something additional to establish a prima facie case—background 
circumstances showing that the employer at issue is one which would 
be likely to engage in this historically uncommon type of 
discrimination.277  However, other courts object to imposing the 
additional requirement in the prima facie case,278 with some of those 
courts reasoning that to do so would violate an important theoretical 
foundation of employment discrimination law—equal treatment of 
similarly situated persons.279 
Thus, the prima facie case stage of McDonnell Douglas has proven to 
be too weak of a basis to support a rebuttable presumption of 
discrimination and to be inadequately flexible to address various 
types of cases.  Similarly, the predicate facts of res ipsa loquitur, on 
which the inference of breach is founded, have been undermined, 
challenged, and revised. 
In addition to the facts constituting the prima facie case, the other 
predicate fact upon which Furnco based the inference of 
discrimination was the plaintiff’s production of sufficient evidence 
that the employer’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
was pretextual.  Over the years, the Court has wavered in its 
conviction about the inference to be drawn from that predicate fact, 
as the debate spanned decades and two Supreme Court decisions.280  
As with the prima facie case, the Supreme Court has spent its 
resources, as well as those of the lower courts and litigants, 
                                                            
reverse discrimination cases, where the plaintiff was not a member of a historically 
discriminated against group”). 
 277. See, e.g., Duffy v. Wolle, 123 F.3d 1026, 1036 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting that 
being a minority is enough to suggest discrimination, but being a historically non-
discriminated-against person requires more); Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 
F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding that it makes no sense in contemporary 
society to infer majority discrimination in the same manner as minority 
discrimination). 
 278. See, e.g., Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 161 (3d Cir. 1999) (rejecting the 
background circumstances factor because all that is required is a showing that “the 
employer is treating some people less favorably than others based upon a trait that is 
protected under Title VII”); Lind v. City of Battle Creek, 681 N.W.2d 334, 335 (Mich. 
2004) (overruling a prior decision that used the background circumstances 
requirement because it clearly conflicted with the state’s civil rights laws). 
 279. See, e.g., Clements v. Barden Miss. Gaming, L.L.C., 373 F. Supp. 2d 653, 
667–68 (N.D. Miss. 2004) (calling the background circumstances requirement 
“illogical and even dangerous”);  Lind, 681 N.W.2d at 335 (stating that “‘individual’ 
means ‘individual’”). 
 280. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000) 
(holding that, on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, a plaintiff is not required 
to go beyond proof of the prima facie case and pretext in order for the fact finder to 
infer discrimination); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) 
(holding that, for a final judgment, a fact finder may—but is not required to—infer 
discrimination from evidence showing the employer’s given reasons are false). 
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interpreting the meaning of the “res ipsa McDonnell Douglas” 
framework, rather than addressing questions about the ultimate issue 
of employment discrimination.281  Termed pretext-plus versus 
pretext-only,282 the primary issue in the debate was determining the 
procedural effect of a plaintiff’s introducing sufficient evidence of 
pretext at stage three. 
The Court addressed the effect of proving pretext vis-à-vis two 
burdens that the plaintiff bears:  persuasion and production.  First, 
the Court addressed the burden of persuasion in 1993 in St. Mary’s 
Honor Center v. Hicks,283 wherein the Court held that proving pretext 
permits, but does not require, the fact finder to infer 
discrimination.284  While many civil rights advocates and 
commentators were chagrined by the holding in Hicks, it was 
consistent with the procedural effect generally accorded to res ipsa in 
tort law, although some courts and jurisdictions accord res ipsa a 
stronger effect.285  Realistically, not much more could be expected 
from an analysis in which the Court already had shown a significant 
lack of confidence. 
The Court considered the procedural effect of pretext in the 
context of the burden of production in 2000 in Reeves.286  The Court 
considered whether sufficient evidence of pretext would enable a 
plaintiff to survive a challenge to sufficiency of the evidence 
(summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law).287  The Court 
held that proving pretext may permit the trier of fact to conclude 
that the employer discriminated, although the Court would not state 
                                                            
 281. See supra note 265 and accompanying text (explaining that pretext analysis 
forces courts to scrutinize litigants’ abilities to satisfy the elements of an ill-fitted 
framework, rather than encourage courts to apply antidiscrimination statutes to the 
particular facts of a case). 
 282. See Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses:  The Fallacy of 
the “Pretext-Plus” Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57, 65–66 
(1991) (defining the pretext-only rule as requiring only evidence that the defendant 
lied about its discriminatory motivations, while defining the pretext-plus rule as 
requiring pretext and an actual showing of discriminatory intent). 
 283. 509 U.S. 502 (1993). 
 284. Id. at 511 (establishing the procedural effect of proving pretext as giving rise 
to a permissive inference of discrimination, rather than a rebuttable presumption). 
 285. See supra Part II.A.3 (explaining that the majority of jurisdictions interpret the 
procedural effect of res ipsa loquitur as creating a permissible inference of breach, 
but some courts view it as creating a rebuttable presumption).  Many civil rights 
advocates and commentators were chagrined by the holding in Hicks.  See, e.g., 
Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks:  Questioning the Basic 
Assumption, 26 CONN. L. REV. 997, 998, 1037–38 (1994) (chronicling the continued 
prevalence of discrimination in American society and criticizing the Supreme Court 
for placing an unfair burden on plaintiffs in Hicks). 
 286. 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000). 
 287. Id. at 147–48. 
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that proof of pretext always will support such a conclusion.288  So, 
once again in Reeves, the Court held that a plaintiff’s successful 
navigation of the pretext analysis yields a permissive inference of 
discrimination at yet another procedural juncture.289  However, the 
Court in Reeves suggested that the permissive inference is stronger at 
summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law than it is in Hicks 
at verdict or judgment.290  Justice Ginsburg found this suggestion 
somewhat unsatisfactory.291  In her concurring opinion in Reeves, she 
ruminated that the Court in the future might need to more precisely 
define circumstances that would require a plaintiff to submit 
evidence beyond a prima facie case and pretext.292  Such 
circumstances, she anticipated, would be uncommon.293 
Thus, the Supreme Court and lower courts have struggled with the 
procedural effect and substantive meaning of two stages of the three-
part McDonnell Douglas analysis.  As previously discussed above, these 
struggles are analogous to the uncertainties and discomforts courts 
have experienced with the prerequisite or predicate facts in res 
ipsa.294  Ultimately what these struggles have demonstrated is that res 
ipsa was ill-suited to employment discrimination law, and the fit has 
become progressively worse since 1973.  The Court and courts have 
spent substantial time and resources attempting to mitigate the 
problems with the framework, but they have failed. 
ii. Creation of an alternative framework 
The second development that has undermined whatever utility “res 
ipsa McDonnell Douglas” might have had is the Court’s recognition 
that the pretext/res ipsa analysis would be inadequate to evaluate all 
types of individual disparate treatment claims.  Consequently, the 
Court created the alternative mixed-motives analysis, which was, and 
is now, much better-suited than pretext/res ipsa to evaluating 
intentional discrimination.  Soon after the Court created the 
mixed—motives analysis, Congress would codify a modified version of 
it.  By creating the second framework and later eradicating the 
dividing line between the cases governed by each framework, the 
Supreme Court led employment discrimination jurisprudence into 
virtual chaos.  
                                                            
 288. Id. at 148. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at 154–55 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. 
 294. See supra Parts II.A–B. 
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In Price Waterhouse, the Court acknowledged that “res ipsa 
McDonnell Douglas” was inadequate to address all types of individual 
disparate treatment cases.295  In that case, the Court created what has 
come to be known as the mixed-motives analysis to analyze cases in 
which more than one motive causes the employer to take an adverse 
employment action.296  Congress would later modify and codify the 
mixed-motives analysis in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, thus 
embedding the “motivating factor”297 and same-decision defense298 
stages of the analysis in Title VII, although the effect of same-decision 
was changed to a limitation on remedies rather than a defense to 
liability.  Faced with the question of which analysis to apply in any 
given case, the lower courts crafted a dividing line based on Justice 
O’Connor’s Price Waterhouse concurrence, whereby McDonnell Douglas 
applied to claims proven by circumstantial evidence and mixed 
motives applied to claims supported by direct evidence.299 
In 2003, the Supreme Court erased the line between McDonnell 
Douglas cases and mixed-motives cases in Desert Palace, holding that 
direct evidence is not necessary to obtain a “motivating factor” jury 
instruction under Title VII as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 
1991.300  Since the decision in Desert Palace, lower courts have had no 
guidance on how to decide which of the two analyses applies to any 
given case.  This debate is akin to the issue in tort law of whether res 
                                                            
 295. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 260 (1989) (White, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (distinguishing Price Waterhouse, a “mixed-motives” case 
in which multiple factors may have motivated the adverse employment decision, 
from pretext cases like McDonnell Douglas, which involve discrimination driven by one 
“true” motive); id. at 270–71 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (justifying a 
departure from the McDonnell Douglas framework when a plaintiff presents direct 
evidence that the employer relied substantially on factors forbidden under Title VII). 
 296. Under the now defunct Price Waterhouse mixed-motives analysis, the plaintiff 
bears the burden of showing that the employer’s discrimination was partly motivated 
by an unlawful reason.  If the plaintiff succeeds, the burden then shifts to the 
defendant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have made 
the same decision without relying on the unlawful reason.  Only after carrying this 
burden could the defendant avoid a finding of liability. Id. at 258 (majority opinion); 
see also Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 93 (2003) (defining a “mixed-motive” 
case as involving both legitimate and illegitimate reasons for discrimination). 
 297. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). 
 298. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(B). 
 299. See Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 851–54 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(highlighting the confusion among courts over the appropriate application of the 
McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis and Price Waterhouse mixed-motives analysis), aff’d, 
539 U.S. 90 (2003); Martin J. Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment (Really), 59 HASTINGS 
L.J. 643, 647 (2008) (tracing the dividing line between direct and circumstantial 
evidence—and thus mixed-motives and pretext analyses—to Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence in Price Waterhouse). 
 300. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 101 (lowering the bar from direct evidence to 
“sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the 
evidence” that an unlawful motivation factored into an employer’s decision making). 
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ipsa may be applied in cases in which direct evidence of 
breach/nonbreach is available.301 
b. The overarching theme:  A tool for plaintiffs becomes a straightjacket 
for litigants and a distraction from consideration of substantive 
discrimination issues 
As the Supreme Court and lower courts have tinkered with the res 
ipsa analysis of employment discrimination law and created an 
alternative analysis to evaluate some undefined subset of individual 
disparate treatment claims, it has become increasingly clear that the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis has lost the positive aspects of res ipsa 
loquitur, while the negative characteristics of res ipsa have been 
replicated and exacerbated.  The three-stage structure has become a 
shibboleth that courts dare not fail to recite, but all the while, courts 
remain unconvinced that a prima facie case and pretext sufficiently 
indicate discriminatory motivation. 
The elements of the prima facie case and pretext, the stages of the 
pretext analysis on which the plaintiff bears the burden of 
production, are the analogues of the predicate facts for application of 
res ipsa.  The McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis is not about whether 
discrimination occurred but about issues that may lead to an 
inference of discrimination.302  The prima facie case, with its varying 
elements, is particularly weak and courts progressively have come to 
suspect that it indicates little about the ultimate issue of 
discrimination.303  Thus, over its forty years, the res ipsa loquitur of 
employment discrimination law has become an exemplar of a 
phenomenon described by Professor Suzanna Sherry in which old 
and established legal doctrines seemingly change abruptly 
(analogized to earthquakes) when in reality what has occurred is that 
the foundational facts embedded within them and on which the 
                                                            
 301. See supra Parts II.A.3. 
 302. The Supreme Court expressed the idea this way:  “In a Title VII case, the 
allocation of burdens and the creation of a presumption by the establishment of a 
prima facie case is intended progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive 
factual question of intentional discrimination.”  Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981); see also Sperino, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 94 
(explaining that “[e]mbedded within the McDonnell Douglas inquiry are several sets of 
facts that masquerade as legal standards”). 
 303. See Sherry, supra note 6, at 164 (explaining that plaintiffs are not required 
initially to prove discriminatory intent, but instead, intent is presumed from the four 
elements of the prima facie case because courts believe they give rise to an inference 
of discrimination); Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note 7, at 14 (listing the four 
elements of proof required to establish a prima facie case:  (1) that the plaintiff 
belonged to a racial minority; (2) that he applied for a job and was qualified; (3) that 
he was rejected; and (4) that the job remained open). 
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doctrines are based have changed over time (analogized to 
movement of the tectonic plates).304  Hicks was an apparent 
“earthquake,” which suggests that the Supreme Court actually had 
changed its belief about the foundational facts of the McDonnell 
Douglas analysis.305  Professor Sherry posits that the Court might 
reasonably believe that with the passage of time since the enactment 
of the discrimination laws, it has become less likely that employers 
intentionally discriminate on prohibited bases.306 
If the courts have little confidence that the predicate facts give rise 
to an inference of discrimination, then the res ipsa of employment 
discrimination law is no longer performing its function, and we 
would be better off simply addressing the issue of discrimination.307  
Still, the framework may serve a useful purpose because some courts 
will continue to believe the inference is reasonable in some cases—
that is, McDonnell Douglas will continue to serve as a useful tool for 
some plaintiffs to marshal their circumstantial evidence.308  However, 
the framework presents at least two other problems.  First, it suffers 
not just from reduced usefulness as a tool, but it has become a 
hindrance, as courts recite it and require plaintiffs (and defendants) 
to try to fit their evidence into it no matter how their evidence may 
differ from the framework’s prescribed elements.  Thus, what the 
Supreme Court designed as a tool to help plaintiffs organize and 
present circumstantial evidence has become a straightjacket into 
which they must force their cases.309  Second, the courts (as well as 
                                                            
 304. Sherry, supra note 6, at 145–46. 
 305. See id. at 165–66 (attributing the change in law to the Court’s shifting belief 
that discriminatory motives cannot be assumed to drive adverse employment 
decisions). 
 306. Id. at 164–65; see also Calloway, supra note 285, at 997–98, 1007–09 (observing 
that in Hicks, the Supreme Court questioned the basic assumption that 
discrimination is likely the reason behind adverse employment decisions); Okediji, 
supra note 25, at 52 (stating that Hicks “reflects the subtle, but increasingly palpable, 
societal conviction that race is no longer the problem that it once was at the time of 
Title VII’s enactment”). 
 307. See Sperino, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 71, 81 (advocating for courts to 
abandon the use of frameworks and directly address the substantive 
discrimination inquiry). 
 308. The McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis can aid plaintiffs in proving 
intentional discrimination using circumstantial evidence because the rationale for 
importing res ipsa loquitur into employment discrimination law would still apply in 
courts that continue to believe that unexplained adverse employment decisions 
commonly result from discrimination.  See supra note 232 and accompanying text; see 
also Sperino, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 116 (“McDonnell Douglas’s core holding—that 
discrimination can be shown by establishing that the employer lied about the reason 
for its decision—could be an important supporting doctrine in some cases.”). 
 309. See Okediji, supra note 25, at 52–53 (stating that Hicks’s version of pretext 
analysis “artificially constrains factfinding”); Sperino, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 71 
(“[T]he key question in modern discrimination cases is often whether the plaintiff 
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commentators, litigants, employers, and others) view the proof 
structures as “the thing itself,” rather than the shadow on the wall of 
the cave,310  and an inordinate number of decisions and other 
resources are devoted to explicating, developing, and unraveling the 
proof structures.311  Viewing employment discrimination law in such a 
distorted way inevitably stunts productive and innovative 
development of the law because courts and others do not see the 
need for reform as they focus on the framework as the manifestation 
of discrimination.312 
Among the many problems with the McDonnell Douglas framework, 
it does not work well for discrimination cases that deviate 
substantially from the most common factual scenarios of 
discrimination.313  Reverse discrimination cases, as previously 
discussed, do not fit well within res ipsa McDonnell Douglas because 
they do not involve historically common types of discrimination.314  
For example, in Burlington v. News Corp.,315 a Caucasian news anchor 
was fired for causing substantial racial unrest in the workplace after 
using the word “nigger” in discussions in a meeting about whether 
the word should be used in a news report.316  The Caucasian plaintiff 
contended that he was disciplined for a non-derogatory use of the 
word, while many black employees who also used the word were not 
disciplined.317  The court recognized the threshold question of which 
analysis it should apply—the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis or 
                                                            
can cram his or her facts into a recognized structure and not whether the facts 
establish discrimination.”). 
 310. In the allegory of the Cave, Plato discusses a hypothetical situation in which 
what someone perceives as reality is actually shadows cast on the wall of the cave by 
the true objects.  See Corbett, supra note 25.. 
 311. See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000) 
(considering the procedural effect of proving pretext); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. 
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (same). 
 312. See Sperino, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 86 (asserting that “[s]ince the late 
1980s . . . courts have largely failed to consider new ways of thinking about 
discrimination and have instead chosen to rely on the existing typology”); cf. Samuel 
R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1, 47 (2006) (explaining that advocates of a structuralist approach to 
employment discrimination law could contend that the alternative may “remit 
workplace inequities to the increasingly outmoded tools of an employment 
discrimination law designed in the 1960s and based on a very different model of 
discrimination, of the workplace, and of regulation than that which prevails today”). 
 313. See Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note 7, at 15 (observing that “[i]n 
practice, McDonnell Douglas causes courts to focus on narrow visions of how 
discrimination happens and therefore makes it unlikely that a plaintiff trying to 
prevail on a strange scenario will survive the test”). 
 314. See supra notes 239–40 and accompanying text. 
 315. 759 F. Supp. 2d 580 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
 316. Id. at 584–89. 
 317. Id. at 592. 
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mixed-motives.318  The court said it was using both analyses, but it 
posed the key question ostensibly under the pretext stage:  “[C]an an 
employer be held liable under Title VII for enforcing or condoning 
the social norm that it is acceptable for African Americans to say 
‘nigger’ but not whites?”319  Thus, the court identified the core 
discrimination issue as one that actually had little to do with the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis, though the issue merited careful 
consideration and the court dutifully crammed it into the pretext 
stage.320  Examining that issue, the court concluded that African 
Americans indeed might tolerate use of the word by other African 
Americans and be insulted when the word is used by white people.321  
Nevertheless, the court found that even if such a social norm exists, it 
is the type of discriminatory social norm that Title VII was enacted to 
counter.322  The court thus identified and addressed the real issue in 
the case, and the pretext analysis did nothing but clutter the opinion 
and impede the analysis. 
In another recent reverse discrimination case, Smith v. Lockheed-
Martin Corp.,323 the ultimate issue focused on comparative treatment 
of African-American and white employees.324  White employees were 
fired for emailing a racially offensive joke, while black employees who 
engaged in similar conduct were not fired.325  The court forced the 
evidence into the McDonnell Douglas analysis but twice expressly 
disclaimed any real operative importance of the analysis.  The court 
rejected the notion that satisfying the three stages of the pretext 
analysis is the sine qua non of surviving summary judgment.  Thus, 
failure to produce a suitable comparator did not doom plaintiff’s 
case.  The pretext analysis merely provides guidance in resolving 
whether there is a reasonable inference of discrimination.326 
The Eleventh Circuit in Smith went on to find that the plaintiff 
presented sufficient circumstantial evidence of racial discrimination 
to avoid summary judgment.327  However, the court’s blasphemous 
                                                            
 318. Id. at 590. 
 319. Id. at 596. 
 320. See id. (noting that the issue had not previously been decided by the 
federal courts). 
 321. Id. at 597 (drawing upon historical context to conclude that African 
Americans often use the word ironically, satirically, or affectionately, while the use of 
the word by white persons often carries belittling, oppressive, and dehumanizing 
undertones). 
 322. Id. 
 323. 644 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 324. Id. at 1326. 
 325. Id. at 1324. 
 326. Id. at 1346 n.86. 
 327. Id. at 1346–47. 
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declarations regarding McDonnell Douglas would cause another court 
to reassert fealty to the res ipsa analysis.  A federal district court, 
faced with citation to the apostasy of Smith’s departure from 
McDonnell Douglas, declared as follows:  “To the extent that Smith 
suggests the burden-shifting paradigm of McDonnell Douglas can be 
ignored in a case based on circumstantial evidence, freeing the 
plaintiff from any obligation to establish a prima facie case, it is in 
tension with a long line of Eleventh Circuit precedent.”328  Although 
some courts diverge from the McDonnell Douglas straightjacket, most 
do not.  Even among those that do, virtually all feel constrained to 
at least pay lip service to it. 
The restrictive effect on litigation, shoving all evidence into the 
three stages of the pretext analysis, and the focus of courts on the 
framework rather than the real issues of discrimination are therefore 
intertwined.  When courts liberate themselves somewhat from the 
McDonnell Douglas vise grip, as in Burlington and Smith, they are able to 
identify and grapple with the actual issues of employment 
discrimination. 
3. The tenacity of res ipsa/McDonnell Douglas 
In light of the weaknesses of the framework and forty years of 
tinkering with it, one would think that the Supreme Court long ago 
would have expelled res ipsa from employment discrimination law.  
Congress presented a golden opportunity when, in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, it codified a version of the mixed-motives analysis.329  The 
Court in Desert Palace, could have sent res ipsa back to tort law rather 
than leave lower courts with the conundrum of which framework 
applies in a given case, but it did not.330  Notwithstanding an 
outpouring of scholarship arguing that Desert Palace should have 
signaled the end of McDonnell Douglas,331 it flourishes.   
                                                            
 328. Bell v. Crowne Mgmt., LLC, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1232 (S.D. Ala. 2012). 
 329. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), -5(g)(2)(B) (2006). 
 330. See Katz, supra note 299, at 643 (noting that “when the Court had a chance to 
clarify things in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, the Court made things worse, not better”); 
Jamie Darin Prenkert, The Role of Second-Order Uniformity in Disparate Treatment Law:  
McDonnell Douglas’s Longevity and the Mixed-Motives Mess, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 511, 512 
(2008) (arguing that Desert Palace has contributed to the vitality of McDonnell 
Douglas). 
 331. See, e.g., Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law:  Price Waterhouse Is 
Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1932 (2004) (arguing that 
the “motivating factor” showing should apply to all individual disparate treatment 
cases because the slight differences between the McDonnell Douglas and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 do not justify maintaining two separate analyses for individual 
disparate treatment cases). 
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When the Fifth Circuit took on the task of addressing the 
question left by Desert Palace in Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., it 
merged the pretext and mixed-motives analyses into what it termed 
the “modified McDonnell Douglas approach,” which retained the 
three stages of the pretext analysis, although they seemed 
perfunctory when the court grafted the “motivating factor” standard 
of mixed motives onto the third stage as an alternative to pretext.332  
In another example of the resilience of McDonnell Douglas, when 
bills were introduced in Congress to overturn the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Gross, they expressly stated that the McDonnell Douglas 
analysis was to be preserved as a way to prove discrimination under 
all the employment discrimination laws.333  Thus, notwithstanding 
its monumental shortcomings, the McDonnell Douglas proof 
structure maintains a tenacious and powerful grip on employment 
discrimination law—almost like the siren call of res ipsa loquitur 
beckoning first-year law students to the perilous shoals of peripheral 
issues and irrelevant discussion. 
III. THROWING RES IPSA OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
WAREHOUSE 
Seeing the McDonnell Douglas proof structure as res ipsa helps 
explain why it increasingly has served employment discrimination law 
poorly.  Perhaps this view of the hoary pretext analysis will provide 
some added impetus for finally dispatching with it and moving to a 
more appropriate and more flexible standard.  Also this perspective 
should encourage Congress and the courts to develop a more 
deliberative and discriminating approach for incorporating tort law 
into employment discrimination law.  Adopting such a new approach 
is important because tort law still has much to offer the younger and 
relatively underdeveloped body of employment discrimination law. 
Like the infamous barrel that fell from the warehouse and spawned 
res ipsa loquitur, McDonnell Douglas needs to be cast out of 
employment discrimination law.  Although there have been many calls 
to expel the McDonnell Douglas analysis, few of them have invoked its ill-
matched tort underpinnings as a reason.334  Judge Wood of the 
Seventh Circuit, in a recent concurring opinion, called for the 
abrogation of the McDonnell Douglas analysis because, although it was 
                                                            
 332. Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F. 3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 333. See supra note 27 (discussing the proposed Protecting Older Workers Against 
Discrimination Act, S. 2189, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(4)(E) (2012)). 
 334. See Prenkert, supra note 330, at 513 (noting that “a chorus of commentators 
has rightfully clamored to euthanize the [McDonnell Douglas] framework”). 
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designed to clarify and simplify a plaintiff’s presentation of her case, 
“both of those goals have gone by the wayside.”335  Judge Wood then 
declared that “[c]ourts manage tort litigation every day without the ins 
and outs of these methods of proof, and I see no reason why 
employment discrimination litigation . . . could not be handled in the 
same straightforward way.”336  Ironically, many employment 
discrimination law principles, including the McDonnell Douglas analysis, 
have been borrowed from tort law. 
The McDonnell Douglas proof structure’s declining performance 
over four decades already has been chronicled.  If the Supreme 
Court had expressly recognized the analysis as at least a derivative of 
res ipsa when it adopted the analysis in 1973, there were reasons 
based on res ipsa’s use and track record in tort law to question 
whether it was appropriate for employment discrimination law.  For 
one, although res ipsa was a doctrine to be used by plaintiffs to assist 
them in presenting circumstantial evidence of a breach, it was a tool 
of last resort for plaintiffs who could not otherwise prove a 
breach.337  The Court in McDonnell Douglas seemed to understand 
that it was establishing the fundamental analytical tool for 
individual disparate treatment claims—the most common 
employment discrimination claims.338  The pretext analysis would 
not be a backup tool like res ipsa was.  An analytical tool of last 
resort was not designed to function as the most basic analyses of a 
body of law. 
Two other distinctions between the use of res ipsa in tort law and 
the pretext analysis in employment discrimination also should have 
raised concerns.  First, the Court was adopting, without significant 
modification, an analysis for intentional discrimination cases used in 
torts for negligence cases.339  A number of tort doctrines distinguish 
between negligence and intentional torts and impose greater 
burdens on alleged intentional tortfeasors than negligent 
                                                            
 335. Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 863 (7th Cir. 2012) (Wood, J., 
concurring). 
 336. Id. 
 337. See Okediji, supra note 25, at 84 (discussing res ipsa loquitur as a way of 
proving negligence without actual proof). 
 338. See Sperino, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 76 (noting that the Court created the 
burden-shifting test to analyze individual disparate treatment cases); cf. Zimmer, 
supra note 331, at 1893 (“‘Disparate treatment’ . . . is the most easily understood type 
of discrimination.” (citing Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 
n.15 (1977))). 
 339. See Okediji, supra note 25, at 83 (explaining that in torts, circumstantial 
evidence may be sufficient to support an inference of negligence under res ipsa 
loquitur). 
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tortfeasors.340  Perhaps the Court considered that the three stages and 
shifting burdens of production of the McDonnell Douglas analysis were 
an adequate modification of res ipsa.  However, considering the 
distinction between negligence and intent, the Court might have 
shifted both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion, 
but it did not.341  Or the Court might have resolved the issue of what 
procedural effect to attach to a showing of pretext in ways more 
favorable to plaintiffs than it did in Hicks and Reeves342  Second, 
whereas res ipsa usually addresses physical acts and physical injuries, 
the McDonnell Douglas analysis is used to evaluate a mental state.  
While courts may be readily willing to draw inferences about physical 
facts based on surrogate questions, they may be less comfortable 
inferring discriminatory mental states based on similar surrogate 
questions. 
Beyond the distinctions between torts and employment 
discrimination, res ipsa did not have a sterling record of performance 
in torts.  There were a number of problems and uncertainties with res 
ipsa in tort law,343 and those difficulties merited consideration before 
res ipsa was adopted as the basic analysis for a landmark civil rights 
and public policy statute. 
Regardless of whether the Court should have adopted res ipsa for 
employment discrimination law and whether it could have been 
modified adequately to accommodate employment discrimination 
law, the time has come to push the McDonnell Douglas barrel out of 
the warehouse.  A superior alternative is readily available.  In the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Congress codified a version of the mixed-motives 
analysis in Title VII.344  The plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by 
demonstrating that discrimination was a motivating factor in the 
employer’s decision.345  At that point, the employer is liable, but if the 
                                                            
 340. Consider, for example, with negligence, proximate cause cuts off liability of 
defendants for unforeseeable harm, whereas the principle of extended liability holds 
that defendants who commit intentional torts are liable for the full extent of harm 
they cause, no matter how unforeseeable.  See Shades Ridge Holding Co. v. Cobbs, 
Allen & Hall Mortg. Co., 390 So. 2d 601, 607  (Ala. 1980) (setting forth the policy 
rationale that liability should fall on the intentional tortfeasor, rather than allow the 
victim to go uncompensated). 
 341. See Okediji, supra note 25, at 85 (explaining that although the burden of 
persuasion remains with the plaintiff under the McDonnell Douglas framework, policy 
considerations ultimately dictate where the burden of persuasion lies). 
 342. See supra Part II.C.2(a)(i). 
 343. See supra Part II.A (discussing three troublesome features of res ipsa loquitor:  
(1) uncertainty regarding the predicate facts that determine the applicability of res 
ipsa loquitur in any given case; (2) the procedural effect of res ipsa loquitur; and (3) 
uncertainty regarding the types of cases to which res ipsa loquitur is applicable). 
 344. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), -5(g)(2)(B) (2006). 
 345. Id. § 2000e-2(m). 
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employer can demonstrate (satisfy the burden of persuasion) that it 
would have made the same decision for nondiscriminatory reasons, 
the defendant employer can limit remedies.346  Commentators have 
advocated for the replacement of the McDonnell Douglas analysis with 
some version of the mixed-motives analysis, at least similar to the one 
added to Title VII by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.347  That framework 
resolves or ameliorates many of the problems raised by the pretext 
analysis.  First, the motivating factor standard does not artificially 
cabin the types of evidence that must be presented by the parties as 
the pretext analysis does. Second, it does not base an inference or 
presumption of discrimination on presentation of evidence to satisfy 
predicate issues that are surrogates for the real issue of 
discrimination.  Third, the motivating factor standard does not 
establish an inference or presumption based on historical patterns 
of discrimination that may have changed, or that courts and jurors 
may think have changed, over time.  In the foregoing ways and 
others, the mixed-motives analysis is less rigid and more generally 
appropriate than the pretext analysis, and it already has Congress’s 
imprimatur for use with Title VII. 
Even if McDonnell Douglas were rejected, another step would be 
necessary to make the statutory mixed-motives analysis applicable to 
individual disparate treatment claims under all the employment 
discrimination laws.  The Supreme Court in Gross defined the 
statutory language “because of” as meaning but for causation and 
rejected the mixed-motives analysis for age discrimination claims 
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.348  Because of 
                                                            
 346. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
 347. See, e.g., William R. Corbett, Fixing Employment Discrimination Law, 62 SMU L. 
REV. 81, 106, 108 (2009) (arguing that Congress should replace the pretext proof 
structure with a version of the modified mixed-motives structure); Katz, supra note 
299, at 643–44 (advocating for the framework prescribed by the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, which would eliminate doctrinal confusion and unify fragmented disparate 
treatment law); Prenkert, supra note 330, at 516 (urging Congress to clarify mixed-
motives jurisprudence by creating a unified framework and eradicating McDonnell 
Douglas); Zimmer, supra note 331, at 1891 (analyzing Desert Palace’s potential to 
surpass McDonnell Douglas and give rise to a new, uniform proof structure). 
 348. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009).  Since the Court was 
interpreting the “because of” statutory language, the decision might render the 
mixed-motives framework inapplicable to all discrimination statutes except Title VII, 
which also has the statutory “motivating factor” language.  See Serwatka v. Rockwell 
Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 961–62 (7th Cir. 2010) (Gross holding renders mixed 
motives inapplicable to Americans with Disabilities Act).  But see Smith v. Xerox 
Corp., 602 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 2010) (declining to extend the holding of Gross to 
antiretaliation provision in Title VII).  The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to 
resolve the applicability of Gross to the antiretaliation provision of Title VII.  Nassar v. 
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 674 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 2013 WL 
203552 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2013) (No. 12-484). 
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Gross, to effectuate unification of all disparate treatment law under 
mixed motives, either the Court would need to overrule the case or 
Congress would have to make the mixed-motives analysis available 
under all the employment discrimination statutes.349 
Another issue that Congress should consider if the statutory mixed-
motives analysis were to become the sole individual disparate 
treatment analysis is the effect of the same-decision defense.350  
Under the current Title VII defense, if a defendant satisfies the 
burden of persuasion on same-decision, it will limit remedies, 
eliminating all monetary remedies that would go to the plaintiff.351  
Before recommending that Congress simply amend the statutes to say 
that the current statutory mixed-motives analysis applies to all 
individual  intentional discrimination cases, it is worth asking whether 
changes should be made in light of the fact that the pretext proof 
structure would be gone.  In the 1991 Act, Congress clearly indicated 
the way in which it wished to modify the Price Waterhouse mixed-
motives analysis.  However, if Congress also had thought it were 
abolishing the pretext analysis and replacing it with a unified analysis, 
it might have done things differently, such as giving a different effect 
to the same-decision defense.  Thus, Congress should consider 
modifications to the current statutory mixed-motives proof structure. 
Congress is the better body to abrogate McDonnell Douglas than the 
Supreme Court.352  Although the Court should have dispensed with 
the pretext analysis in Desert Palace or thereafter, when it eradicated 
the line of demarcation between cases to be analyzed under pretext 
and mixed motives, the Court did not do so, and nine years after 
Desert Palace, it still has not done so.  Rather than removing ill-fitting 
tort principles from employment discrimination law, Staub 
demonstrates that the Court is inclined to forge ahead with 
importation of tort law.353  Generally, the Court simply has not 
expressly overruled employment discrimination precedents.354  
                                                            
 349. The proposed Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act would 
do this, but it also would preserve the McDonnell Douglas analysis.  S. 2189, 112th 
Cong. § 2(a)(4)(E) (2012). 
 350. Corbett, supra note 347, at 107. 
 351. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B); Corbett, supra note 347, at 106. 
 352. See Martin J. Katz, Gross Disunity, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 857, 889 (2010) 
(commenting that “given the Court’s apparent hostility to unification . . . unification 
will need to come from Congress”). 
 353. See supra notes 32–44 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s adoption of the highly-criticized doctrine of proximate cause in Staub). 
 354. See Lemos, supra note 6, at 427 (observing that “[i]f judged by the rate of 
outright reversals, the Court’s decisions in the Title VII arena have been 
exceptionally stable:  not once in the history of Title VII has the Court overruled a 
prior opinion”). 
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Furthermore, if the pretext analysis were thrown out of the 
warehouse, there are issues that Congress needs to consider in 
refining the replacement mixed-motives framework.  Removing the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis should substantially improve employment 
discrimination law.  That important step also might prompt 
consideration of the general issue of tortification of employment 
discrimination law.  But that is an issue for another day.  
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s latest foray into tortification of employment 
discrimination law in Staub is alarming.  However, one can only guess 
how the concept of proximate cause will develop in discrimination law.  
The McDonnell Douglas/pretext framework, which is a thinly veiled 
version of res ipsa loquitur, has a forty-year track record.  Whether res 
ipsa should have been imported into discrimination law with only 
minor modifications in 1973 is debatable.  Regardless, during its 
tenure, it has suffered from declining performance, it has mangled 
cases, and it has impeded the innovative development of employment 
discrimination law.  The time has come to reject this pretext for res 
ipsa loquitur and let employment discrimination speak for itself. 
